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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cases, even Supreme Court cases, interpreting statutes 
have precedential value until there are subsequent material 
changes in the statute. At that point, the case law must be re-
assessed to determine whether the changes in the statute im-
pact the court’s statutory analysis. One should not blindly fol-
low a case interpreting a statute without considering whether 
the statute has been changed and, if so, the impact of any such 
change. 
This article deals with one such situation in the area of 
medical device regulation and product liability preemption.1 
                                                          
 1. We do not address whether preemption is good public policy or not. We 
leave that debate to others. Rather, we argue that the Food Drug & Cosmetic 
Act and Supreme Court authority must be applied consistently. Those that 
believe preemption should be expanded or contracted should address their 
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This article questions whether litigants and courts have ig-
nored major statutory and regulatory changes in the FDA’s au-
thority over medical devices and have too simplistically fol-
lowed the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.2 
We believe that this is exactly the situation and that the prece-
dential value of Lohr is highly questionable. 
At the forefront of technological innovation is the medical 
device industry. Because of the rapid evolution of science, tech-
nology, and the health care system, the regulatory framework 
governing medical devices changes frequently. As is expected, 
the provisions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) regu-
lating medical devices have evolved substantially since 1938.3 
Under the FDCA, as amended, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring that there is a “rea-
sonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of devices in-
tended for human use.”4 As described in more detail below, to 
achieve the twin objectives of safety and effectiveness, Con-
gress created three classes of medical devices based on risk.5 
High risk, or Class III products, generally must obtain pre-
market approval from the FDA though the Pre-Market Approv-
al (PMA) process.6 Medium risk products, or Class II products, 
generally have a different pathway to market—the 510(k) sys-
tem.7 Compared to the PMA system, the 510(k) system of the 
FDCA creates a quicker and less expensive route for medical 
devices to reach the market.8 Under § 510(k), a product is 
cleared for market distribution if it is “substantially equiva-
lent” to another device that has been cleared through the 
510(k) process, a legally marketed pre-amendment device that 
does not require a PMA, a device type that has been down-
                                                          
concerns to Congress. 
 2. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 3. See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006), for the 
up-to-date version of the Act. 
 4. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2006). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2006). Other sections of § 360c set forth the classi-
fication and reclassification process. 
 6. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e for a description of the PMA process. 
 7. The 510(k) process is described generally in 21 U.S.C. §360c. We rec-
ognize that some lower risk Class III devices are regulated under the 510(k) 
system, some higher risk Class II products are required to go through the 
PMA process, and some higher risk Class I products require a 510(k). For our 
purpose these exceptions are not relevant to our analysis. 
 8. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (detailing the substantial equivalence require-
ments) 
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classified from class III/PMA or to one that has been classified 
through the de novo petition process into the 510(k) system.9 
Section 510(k) is widely employed by medical device manufac-
turers and is responsible for many of the medical devices cur-
rently on the market. While yearly numbers vary, recently 
there have been approximately forty to fifty original PMAs, 
1400 supplemental PMAs and 3 to 4000 510(k)s received per 
year.10 Class I devices are the lowest risk devices and generally 
do not require any premarket authorization or clearance from 
the FDA.11 
Beginning in 2009, the 510(k) process has been under in-
tensive review for a number of reasons. First, there was a high-
ly public controversy involving the 510(k) clearance and then 
rescission of the 510(k) substantial equivalence decision by 
FDA of ReGen Menaflex, a medical device.12 The ReGen 
Menaflex scandal together with some other highly public prod-
uct issues led to allegations that the 510(k) process fails to pro-
tect patients.13 Second, a number of commentators and the 
FDA itself concluded that it was time for a reassessment of the 
510(k) system, at least in part, due to the ever increasing com-
plexity of medical devices and the perceived aging of the 510(k) 
system. In fact, in 2009, the FDA commenced a detailed as-
sessment of the 510(k) process.14 Third, a new administration 
                                                          
 9. Id. 
 10. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PERFORMANCE REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE 
MEDICAL DEVICE USER FEE AMENDMENTS OF 2007, at 6, 20 (2009); OFF. OF 
DEVICE EVALUATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 7 (2009). Note that the 
number of original PMAs cannot be directly compared to the number of 
510(k)s (as some commentators have tried to do) because a change in a PMA 
product may go through the supplemental PMA process while a change in a 
510(k) product triggers a new 510(k). There is no “supplemental” 510(k) anal-
ogous to the supplemental PMA process. 
 11. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 12. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE REGEN 
MENAFLEX: DEPARTURES FROM PROCESSES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES 
LEAVE THE BASIS FOR REVIEW DECISION IN QUESTION—PRELIMINARY REPORT 
(2009) (finding multiple departures from process, procedure and practices over 
a seventeen year period). 
 13. FDA Questions Data Supporting Regen’s Menaflex Ahead of 510(k) Re-
Review, MED. DEVICES TODAY (Mar. 24, 2010, 5:17AM), 
http://www.medicaldevicestoday.com/2010/03/fda-questions-data-supporting-
regens-menaflex-ahead-of-510k-rereview-.html. 
 14. Detailed information about the FDA’s assessment of the 510(k) system 
and plan of action can be found at CDRH Plan of Action for 510(k) and Sci-
ence, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
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has taken the reins at the FDA. Given the 510(k) process’s im-
portant role in medical device use and development, it was con-
sidered imperative to assess whether the current statutory sys-
tem ensures that 510(k) medical devices are both substantially 
equivalent and safe and effective for their intended uses.15 
Separately, two landmark Supreme Court cases have ex-
plored the difference between medical devices cleared via the 
510(k) system and those approved under the PMA process.16 
The two cases delved into the role FDA safety and effectiveness 
determinations play in product liability suits. These cases arise 
in situations in which the manufacturer/defendant has asserted 
that the plaintiff’s claims are preempted under 21 U.S.C. § 
360k.17 Section 360k preempts any state law requirement (in-
cluding a jury verdict) that is “different from, or in addition to,” 
a safety and effectiveness determination made by FDA.18 
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court ruled for the plaintiff 
Lora Lohr, and it held that the FDA did not assess the safety 
and effectiveness of the 510(k) medical device at issue in that 
case as part of the 510(k) clearance process.19 The 510(k) pro-
cess, the Court concluded, only focuses on the medical device’s 
equivalence to another device, not the device’s safety and effec-
tiveness.20 Therefore, the Court concluded that state law prod-
uct liability claims against 510(k) devices are not preempted 
under § 360k. 
Roughly eleven years later, the Supreme Court heard a 
                                                          
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm239448.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). De-
tails of the issues and proposed changes are generally outside of the scope of 
this Article. 
 15. INST. OF MED., PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION—
WORKSHOP REPORT 1 (Theresa Wizemann, ed. 2010) [hereinafter October Re-
port], available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2010/Public-Health-
Effectiveness-of-the-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-Balancing-Patient-Safety-
and-Innovation.aspx. 
 16. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 17. A finding of preemption generally precludes a judge or jury (federal or 
state) from finding liability against the defendant under common product lia-
bility theories. There are situations in which the plaintiff can prevail even if 
there is preemption. These include the “parallel claim” situations articulated 
by Justice Scalia in Riegel, 552 U.S. at 313. 
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 19. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470. 
 20. Id. at 493. 
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similar case yet ruled instead for Defendant Medtronic.21 In 
Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court found that the FDA made clear 
safety and effectiveness findings for devices approved through 
the PMA process.22 Medtronic’s medical device in Riegel—
which was approved through a PMA and not a 510(k)—was 
found to be covered by the preemption provisions of § 360k.23 
Therefore, the state law product liability claims asserted 
against PMA medical devices are preempted by federal law. 
Since these two cases, courts have generally found preemp-
tion for medical devices approved under the PMA process and 
have refused to find preemption for medical devices cleared 
through the 510(k) process.24 
This article seeks to show that the statutory analysis in 
Lohr is outdated and no longer applicable in product liability 
suits against 510(k) medical devices due to material and signif-
icant statutory and regulatory changes in the 510(k) system 
since the relevant date in Lohr. Because the FDA now makes a 
determination of safety and effectiveness under the revised and 
updated 510(k) clearance process, the core logic of Lohr is no 
longer applicable.25 Part II of this Article provides a brief histo-
ry surrounding the introduction of medical devices through the 
PMA process and the 510(k) “substantially equivalent” stand-
ard. In particular, Part II focuses on two landmark cases, Lohr 
and Riegel, and the role of each case in medical device product 
liability suits. Part III of this Article then provides a different 
interpretation to the arguments relied on in Lohr, in light of a 
changing statutory framework. Part III also shows that FDA 
itself (and some, but certainly not all interested stakeholders) 
asserts that the 510(k) system does assess safety and effective-
                                                          
 21. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312. 
 22. The PMA process is the most burdensome way for a medical device to 
reach market. The PMA process requires an assessment that the medical de-
vice at issue is both safe and effective. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 23. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 24. See, e.g., Lake v. TPLC., 1 F. Supp. 2d 84, 86 (D. Mass. 1998); Dow v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 899 F. Supp. 822, 823 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 25. In practice, the question of whether there is preemption in a specific 
510(k) case will depend on the statutory system under which the product was 
cleared. Of course, cases involving products cleared under the 510(k) system in 
place at the relevant time period of Lohr are still governed by Lohr. Products 
cleared under later iterations of the 510(k) process should be assessed under 
those systems. For purposes of this article, we are looking at the two end 
points of the spectrum—the 510(k) system as it existed in 1982 (the critical 
date in Lohr) and today’s 510(k) system. 
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ness for 510(k) devices. 
Ultimately, this article makes two conclusions. First, Lohr 
is not applicable to products cleared under the 2012 iteration of 
the 510(k) system. Second, the current 510(k) system, § 360k, 
and the rationale of Riegel suggest that—due to the safety and 
effectiveness findings for 510(k) cleared devices—the standard 
relied upon in Riegel should supersede that of Lohr for products 
cleared under today’s 510(k) system. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION 
Early medical devices did not present complex or serious 
patient risks. Medical devices circa 1906 (the date of the origi-
nal passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act) were essentially 
acute use products that worked by obvious and simple mechan-
ical processes.26 Crutches, scalpels, bed pans, syringes, and 
bandages had obvious uses and simple requirements. The gen-
eral adulteration and misbranding provisions of the Pure Food 
and Drug Act applied to devices and provided ample protection 
for patients. Even as late as 1938 (the date of the passage of 
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act), medical devices were still 
generally simple mechanical devices.27 Because at this time de-
vices also fit the statutory definition of a “drug,”28 the FDA 
could use its general adulteration and misbranding provisions29 
to address unsafe products or labeling issues. There was no 
perceived need for a device premarket review system or other 
device specific requirements. 
Beginning in the 1960s, there was increasing attention on 
the need to enhance the regulatory oversight of medical devic-
es.30 Various proposals were floated. Perhaps the best known 
and most important were the proposals set forth in the so-
                                                          
 26. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §1, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 
1938). See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. A CENTURY OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION (Wayne L. Pines ed. 2006). 
 27. Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§321 to 399D (2006)). See generally FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., supra note 26. 
 28. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2006); see also United States v. An Article of Drug . 
. . Bacto-Unidisk, 89 S. Ct. 1410 (1969). 
 29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–352 (2006). 
 30. PETER B. HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 977 (3d ed. 2007). 
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called Cooper Commission report.31 The Commission was creat-
ed in the late 1960s and charged with advising policy makers 
about improvements to the device regulatory system.32 The 
Cooper Commission proposed the core risk-based approach to 
device regulation used today. Congress did not create specific 
device centric requirements until the passage of the 1976 Medi-
cal Device Amendments (MDA). The MDA adopted a risk-based 
approach designed to achieve a core statutory objective—
providing a reasonable assurance that medical devices are safe 
and effective.33 
Congress recognized that it would take some time for the 
FDA to implement this system. In the meantime, new devices 
were constantly being brought to the market. Congress did not 
want to stifle the introduction of new products or give compa-
nies that got their products on the market immediately before 
the passage of the 1976 MDA a monopoly while the new system 
was being implemented.34 To address these concerns, Congress 
enacted § 510(k).35 Under this section, one could market a de-
vice that was substantially equivalent to a product marketed 
before the effective date of the MDA.36 Congress also author-
ized the FDA to create device centric performance standards for 
510(k) products to ensure product safety and effectiveness.37 
Over time, Congress, the FDA, and stakeholders recog-
nized that performance standards were too confining, too hard 
to develop, and could not address changing technology. Stake-
holders also recognized that the PMA process was too long and 
complex and did not add value or enhance the safety of a large 
number of medium risk products. Further, unlike drugs, medi-
                                                          
 31. Id. at 977–80. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2006). 
 34. For a general background to the 1976 Medical Device Amendments, 
see October Report, supra note 15, at 3–6. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
supra note 26. 
 35. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539. 
 36. Note that substantial equivalence does not mean being identical. The 
standard is something that is more than similar but less than identical. For a 
more thorough definition of “substantial equivalence,” see Premarket Notifica-
tion (510k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Pre
marketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.htm (last updated 
Sept. 3, 2010). 
 37. Cf. id. 
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cal devices evolve in a fast paced, iterative pattern. Congress 
concluded that the medical device regulatory system needed to 
be updated and improved in order to enhance product safety 
and effectiveness. The result was the Safe Medical Devices Act 
of 1990 (SMDA).38 This was followed by the 1997 enactment of 
the FDA Modernization Act (often referred to as FDAMA)39 and 
then the 2002 enactment of the Medical Device User Fee and 
Modernization Act (MDUFMA).40 These various statutory en-
actments substantially enhanced and further expanded the 
FDA’s regulatory control over medical devices to better ensure 
their safety and effectiveness. 
1. Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
The original FDCA granted the FDA specific authority over 
medical devices.41 In 1976 the Medical Device Amendments 
were adopted as a response to an increasing complexity, im-
portance, and prevalence of medical devices on the market.42 A 
key feature of the 1976 Amendments was FDA classification of 
medical devices into three categories of regulatory controls: 
Class I, Class II, and Class III.43 Each device, whether classi-
fied as Class I, II, or III, is subject to general controls44 or the 
equivalence thereof.45 “Controls” are regulatory measures nec-
essary to assure the safety and effectiveness of the device.46 
Simple devices (so-called Class I devices) are subject to on-
                                                          
 38. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511. 
See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 26. 
 39. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296. 
 40. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-250, 116 Stat. 1588. 
 41. Prior to 1976, medical devices were regulated under the general adul-
teration and misbranding provisions of the FDCA (21 U.S.C. §§ 351 and 352 
respectively). In some cases, the FDA regulated medical devices under the 
drug provisions of the FDCA. See United States v. An Article of Drug . . . 
Bacto-Unidisk . . .,   (1969). 
 42. See October Report, supra note 15, at 3–6. 
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006). 
 44. General controls can include registration and listing requirements, 
compliance with quality system regulations (the so-called QSR requirements 
generally found in 21 C.F.R. § 820 (2011)), and post market reporting obliga-
tions. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) for a more detailed description of general con-
trols. 
 45. 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 46. Id.; see also Device Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 
2009), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm. 
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ly general controls. Devices in Class I do not “present a poten-
tial unreasonable risk of illness or injury”47 and therefore are 
deemed to have a reasonable assurance of safety and effective-
ness provided that they satisfy general controls.48 No pre-
market review by the FDA is required prior to distribution.49 
An example of a Class I device is an examination glove or elas-
tic bandage. 
General controls were not, by themselves, considered suffi-
cient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effective-
ness for higher risk devices. Medium risk devices (Class II de-
vices) were covered by performance standards and also by the 
general controls of the type covering Class I devices.50 The orig-
inal structure of the 510(k) system did not include many of the 
hallmarks of the current 510(k) system. For example, special 
controls are a key element of the current 510(k) system but 
were not created until 1990.51 An example of a medium risk de-
vice is an infusion pump, which presents more risk and re-
quires more safety measures than a Class I examination glove. 
In addition to identifying classes for medical devices, the 
Medical Device Amendments also created a regulatory struc-
ture—§ 510(k)—allowing many Class II, medium risk, post-
1976 devices to be cleared for marketing by demonstrating sub-
stantial equivalence to a device already on the market.52 The 
510(k) system is in many ways a comparative system.53 The 
new device is compared to an existing 510(k) product (referred 
                                                          
 47. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II). 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). 
 49. Jay H. Geller, Medical Device Amendments of 1976—Major Features 
and Comparisons, 31 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 424, 424–28 (1976). 
 50. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2011). 
 51. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511. 
 52. In addition, a number of higher risk Class I devices are also regulated 
under the 510(k) system. Congress also created a number of transitional pro-
cesses to use as the 510(k) and PMA systems were being created and imple-
mented. In many cases, these transitional provisions were designed to cover 
products already on the market in 1976. These transitional provisions are not 
relevant to this discussion. 
 53. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF: THE 510(K) 
PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET 
NOTIFICATIONS [510(K)], at 6 (2011) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE], available 
at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Guidan 
ceDocuments/ucm282958.htm. 
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to as the “predicate” device).54 The predicate has been deter-
mined to be safe and effective based on actual market use and 
other experience. If the new device is comparable to the predi-
cate, then it is viewed as having the same acceptable safety 
profile.55 Substantial equivalence means the device has the 
same intended use as the predicate and generally has the same 
technological characteristics as the predicate device.56 If there 
are different technological characteristics and those technologi-
cal differences do not raise different questions of safety and ef-
fectiveness, the device manufacturer must submit data demon-
strating that the device is as safe and as effective as the 
predicate device.57 Substantial equivalence was to be interpret-
ed narrowly in instances “where necessary to provide reasona-
ble assurance of its safe and effective performance,” but sub-
stantially equivalent did not refer to only devices that were 
“identical” to those already on the market.58. 
High risk devices generally were to go through the PMA 
process—in essence a version of the new Drug Application 
(NDA) process created in 1962.59 These devices are ones for 
which both general and special controls are insufficient to as-
sure the safety and effectiveness of the device.60 
Each level of control in the system was designed to provide 
the necessary oversight and reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness. It was never the intent of Congress that some de-
vices would have to have a “reasonable assurance” of safety and 
effectiveness while others would not need to meet this stand-
ard. The objectives did not vary. Rather Congress used differ-
ent means to achieve that objective. 
2. Safe Medical Device Act of 1990 
The first major post-1976 reformation of the FDCA was the 
Safe Medical Device Act of 1990 (SMDA), which was adopted in 
response to concerns that devices were not being adequately 
regulated and in response to a number of mishaps in the medi-
                                                          
 54. Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 36. In a few cases not rele-
vant to this discussion, so-called “pre-amendment” devices can serve as predi-
cates. 
 55. See id. 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, §§ 514–515. 
 59. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
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cal device realm.61 The SMDA substantially expanded FDA au-
thority over medical device regulation and increased burdens 
on manufacturers of medical devices.62 Specifically, the SMDA 
essentially rewrote the 510(k) process.63 A comparison of the 
1976 statute and the current statute can be found in Appendix 
A. From this comparison, one can see that the current statutory 
framework imposes more safety and effectiveness requirements 
on 510(k) medical devices. 
First, the SMDA explicitly defined substantial equivalence 
and substantially increased the robustness of the 510(k) system 
as well as the regulatory use of “substantial equivalence.”64 
Substantial equivalence now requires the device to have both 
the same intended use and the same technological characteris-
tics as the predicate device.65 If there is a new intended use, the 
product is not eligible for clearance under the 510(k) system.66 
Remember that the safety and effectiveness of the predicate is 
a key basis for concluding that the new device has a reasonable 
assurance of safety and effectiveness. 
If the product is being used for a different purpose (a dif-
ferent disease for example) the comparison to the predicate is 
not sufficient to show safety and effectiveness depending upon 
the impact on safety and effectiveness, and therefore may be 
found to be not substantially equivalent.67 If there are different 
technological characteristics, the device manufacturer must 
submit data—including, as necessary, clinical data—
                                                          
 61. E.g., Russell Mokhiber, The Dalkon Shield: A Deadly Product from 
A.H. Robbins, 8 CORP. CRIME & VIOLENCE (Apr. 1987), 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1987/04/ahrobins.html; see also 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (citing the Dalkon Shield as 
being one of several catastrophic events leading to the Safe Medical Device Act 
of 1990). 
 62. Ellen J. Flannery, The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: An Overview, 
46 FOOD & DRUG COSM. L.J 129, 129 (1991). 
 63. See id. at 131−33. 
 64. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006). 
 65. Id. § 360c(i). 
 66. Id. A “denial” of a 510(k) submission is often referred to as a “not sub-
stantial equivalence” or “NSE” determination. See DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra 
note 53, at 4. A product found to be NSE must either obtain a PMA approval 
under 21 U.S.C. § 360e or, much less commonly, go through the “de novo” pro-
cess under 21 U.S.C. §360c(f) and then, if it meets all regulatory requirements, 
be classified as 510(k) eligible and then be determined as substantially equiva-
lent (or “SE”). 
 67. 21 U.S.C. 360c(i). 
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demonstrating that the device is as safe and as effective as the 
predicate device.68 Particularly, the statute specifically allows 
the FDA to request clinical data when the new device has tech-
nological changes as compared to the predicate device.69 If the 
new technolobical characteristics raise different questions of 
safety and effectiveness, the 510(k) for the device will be found 
to be not substantially equivalent.70 
In addition, the SMDA added a new regulatory control 
mechanism. Medium risk devices were also now made subject 
to “special controls” because “the general controls by them-
selves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of the device.”71 Special controls can in-
clude the 510(k) clearance process, performance standards, 
clinical data, bench data, post market studies, and registries.72 
After the SMDA, a device demonstrating substantial 
equivalence did not have to have a pre-1976 device as a predi-
cate. Any manufacturer can receive 510(k) clearance, so long as 
the device is proven to be substantially equivalent to a 510(k) 
device already determined by the FDA to be substantially 
equivalent.73 After the SMDA, a predicate device could be a de-
vice cleared through the 510(k) process, a device that was mar-
keted prior to May 28, 1976 (a pre-amendment device), or a de-
vice that was originally on the U.S. market as a Class III PMA 
device and later reclassified as a 510(k) device.74 
Additionally, manufacturers of medical devices requiring 
510(k) must submit either a 510(k) summary of safety and ef-
fectiveness data to be reviewed by FDA or a 510(k) statement.75 
Another important change promulgated by the SMDA was 
the modification of pre-1976, Class III high risk devices regula-
tion. The original 1976 Amendments directed the FDA to con-
duct premarket approvals for Class III devices already on the 
market after they had been classified by the agency for at least 
                                                          
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii) (2011). 
 71. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Id. § 360c(i) (“‘[S]ubstantial equivalence’ means, with respect to a 
device being compared to a predicate device . . . .”). Note that the language of 
the statute does not include a requirement that the predicate device be pre-
1976. 
 74. October Report, supra note 15, at 82–84. 
 75. Flannery, supra note 62, at 149. 
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thirty months;76 in reality, at that time, few premarket approv-
als were actually called for under § 515(b) and performed for 
those devices.77 As a result, many pre-1976 Class III devices 
never completed a premarket approval and were never deter-
mined to be safe and effective.78 Thus, devices “substantially 
equivalent” to pre-1976 Class III devices were purported to be 
substantially equivalent in all respects, including safety and 
effectiveness of which there was no actual proof.79 The SMDA 
changed this. After enactment, the SMDA required manufac-
tures of pre-1976 Class III device types still subject to 510(k) to 
submit a detailed summary including adverse data relating to 
the safety and effectiveness of the device type in their 510(k).80 
The FDA then was to consider whether to reclassify the pre-
1976 devices based on the level of regulation needed to provide 
a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.81 If a prod-
uct remained in Class III, the manufacturer was required to ob-
tain a premarket approval for such devices.82 As a result, the 
SMDA substantially modified the 1976 system to better ensure 
the safety and effectiveness of all medical devices hitting the 
market after 1990. The Act demonstrates both Congress’s and 
the FDA’s increased focus on safety. 
3. FDA Modernization Act 
 In 1997, Congress passed the FDA Modernization Act 
(FDAMA). This statute was intended to—among other purpos-
es—better regulate medical devices and to ensure that there 
was an appropriate balance between safety and patient access 
to medical devices.83 FDAMA instituted a number of changes in 
medical device statutory regulation including the creation of 
“good guidance practices” (GGPs) and the enactment of the 
“least burdensome” principle.84 FDAMA further demonstrates 
                                                          
 76. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 515. 
 77. Flannery, supra note 62, at 135. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2006). 
 81. Flannery, supra note 62, at 135−36. 
 82. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i). 
 83. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION & CTR. FOR 
BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, THE LEASE BURDENSOME PROVISIONS 
OF THE FDA MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997: CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES; FINAL 
GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND INDUSTRY 1 (2002). 
 84. Id. at 2 (defining the least burdensome principle as “a successful 
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that Congress has exercised active oversight of the device regu-
latory system. 
4. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 
In 2002, Congress enacted the Medical Device User Fee 
and Modernization Act Congress intended MDUFMA to give 
the FDA resources to “better review medical devices, to enact 
needed regulatory reforms so that medical device manufactur-
ers can bring their safe and effective devices to the American 
people at an earlier time, and to ensure that reprocessed medi-
cal devices (those disposable devices reprocessed for another 
single use) are as safe and effective as original devices.”85 
MDUFMA has since enabled the FDA to better assess medical 
devices, ensuring their safety and effectiveness.86 The enact-
ment of MDUFMA has allowed the FDA to place more time and 
resources towards medical device review.87 
B. CURRENT METHODS FOR REACHING MARKET88 
Currently, a medical device has three methods of reaching 
market. First, most low risk/Class I devices, such as tongue de-
pressors and many in vitro diagnostic devices, do not require 
any 510(k) clearance before market if they meet the criteria in 
section 510(l) of the FDCA and do not add a new use or new 
fundamental technology in comparison to the legally marketed 
Class I device type.89 General controls are considered adequate 
to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness 
of Class I devices.90 Second, a high risk medical device (general-
ly Class III) that has not been classified into Class I or Class II 
and whose risks and how to mitigate those risks are not under-
                                                          
means of addressing a premarket issue that involves the most appropriate in-
vestment of time, effort, and resources on the part of industry and FDA”); see 
also 21 C.F.R. 10.115 (2012). 
 85. Background on MDUFMA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/
MedicalDeviceUserFeeandModernizationActMDUFMA/ucm109149 (last up-
dated Mar. 2, 2009). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Section B outlines the FDA’s current process for medical device re-
view; this is to be distinguished from Section A, which discussed the FDA re-
view process as it stood in 1976. See Appendix A for a detailed table compar-
ing the 1976 FDCA with the current FDCA. 
 89. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3 (2011) 
 90. Id. 
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stood well enough to identify Special Controls to provide rea-
sonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device 
type, may reach market via the PMA route if the manufacturer 
can demonstrate to the FDA that their device is safe and effec-
tive for its intended use.91 Thirdly, a manufacturer can seek 
clearance via the 510(k) system for medium risk prod-
ucts/mostly Class II devices, by meeting all relevant regulatory 
requirements and by showing “substantial equivalence.”92 
1. Braving the Premarket Approval Process 
The PMA process is a regulatory review specifically evalu-
ating the safety and effectiveness of a specific medical device.93 
Before a device manufacturer can market its Class III/PMA 
medical device, it must obtain FDA approval.94 The PMA pro-
cess is the most rigorous process for a medical device to reach 
market. First, the manufacturer must complete the PMA appli-
cation.95 The PMA application requires non-clinical laboratory 
studies and clinical investigations to be submitted to the FDA; 
both are time consuming and expensive.96 The studies must be 
sufficiently thorough to provide reasonable assurance that the 
device is safe and effective for the intended use.97 
Once the application is submitted to the FDA, the device 
manufacturer must wait for review and approval before its de-
vice can be marketed.98 The time taken to respond to PMA ap-
plications is significantly longer compared to manufacturers 
                                                          
 91. Id. 
 92. Clinical (or pre-market) studies of medical devices on human subjects 
are governed by the Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) process under 21 
U.S.C. §360e(j) (2006). The IDE process requires FDA and Institutional Re-
view Board approval of the clinical study to ensure patient protection (includ-
ing safety) and the scientific value of the study. See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 54, 
312 (2011). 
 93. Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMar
ketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/default.htm 
(last updated Jan. 24, 2012). PMAs are required for all Class III medical de-
vices and some Class II devices. 
 94. Id. In addition to the statutory provisions, the FDA has enacted a 
number of implementing regulations. PMA regulations are generally found in 
21 C.F.R. § 814 (2011). 
 95. Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 93. 
 96. See 21 C.F.R § 814.20 (2011). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 93. 
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who seek clearance through a showing of substantial equiva-
lence. For example, if a manufacturer submits a 510(k) it takes, 
on average, seventy-three days of FDA time for the FDA to 
make a decision99 compared to an several hundred days for a 
PMA.100 Overall, the PMA process is more expensive and takes 
more time than clearance through § 510(k). For these reasons, 
manufacturers frequently attempt to gain FDA clearance under 
510(k) rather than approval through a PMA if the device type 
has not already been classified as a PMA. 101 
2. Reaching Market Through a Showing of Substantial 
Equivalence Under § 510(k) 
Class I and Class II devices that are not exempt from the 
510(k) requirements of the FDCA must obtain 510(k) clearance 
before marketing. The actual statutory provisions governing 
the 510(k) process are complex and not susceptible to instant 
understanding. The 510(k) system has been built over time 
with Congress and the FDA adding new requirements or pro-
cesses.102 
Establishing equivalence under 510(k) is faster, cheaper, 
and far less burdensome than the PMA process. In order to be 
classified as substantially equivalent, the device must pass 
                                                          
 99. Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, Analysis of Premarket Review 
Times Under the 510(k) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm263385.htm (last updated Nov. 09, 2011). Note 
that their time frames do not include the days spent by industry in responding 
to FDA questions. 
 100. GAO CONFIRMS TOTAL DEVICE DECISION TIMES TAKING LONGER, FDA 
NOT MEETING SOME GOALS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=9f722b
64-1d0d-4905-9efb-3b5b6871c145. Statutorily, the FDA must respond to PMA 
applications in 180 days after submission. 21 C.F.R. § 814.42 (2011). In prac-
tice, however, the FDA takes much longer. For example, if an amendment to 
the application is submitted, the 180 day clock restarts. CTR. FOR DEVICES & 
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, FDA AND INDUSTRY ACTIONS ON PREMARKET 
APPROVAL APPLICATIONS (PMAS): EFFECT ON FDA REVIEW CLOCK AND GOALS 
7 (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Device 
RegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm089734.pdf. 
 101. See October Report, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that substantial 
equivalence “allow[s] products to go to market quickly with appropriate safe-
guards,” which makes them an attractive option for device manufacturers). 
 102. As discussed earlier, key statutory changes occurred in 1976, 1990, 
1997, and 2002. Lesser changes were made at different times. In addition, over 
time the FDA promulgated new regulations, guidance documents and stand-
ard operating procedures. 
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through a series of checkpoints.103 First, the manufacturers 
must identify a legally marketed predicate device. Second, the 
manufacture must demonstrate that the device has the same 
intended use as the predicate device.104 If the device does not 
have the same intended use as its predicate, the device is “not 
substantially equivalent” (NSE) within the meaning of 
§ 510(k).105 Next, the medical device must have matching tech-
nological characteristics as the predicate device.106 If the tech-
nological characteristics are different from those of the predi-
cate device in such a way that may have an effect the device’s 
safety and effectiveness, the FDA will assess whether those dif-
ferences in technology raise any safety and effectiveness con-
cerns or questions.107 The product, if Class II, must also comply 
with all applicable special controls, including any mandatory 
performance standards.108 
The FDA is permitted by statute to request data from clini-
cal trials demonstrating that the device is both as safe and as 
effective as the predicate device. 109 The data also aids the FDA 
in its substantial equivalence determination.110 
So long as no new type of safety and effectiveness ques-
tions are raised, the 510(k) submitter meets all regulatory re-
quirements, and “accepted scientific methods [are available] for 
assessing the effects” of the device, the FDA will clear the de-
vice.111 
One cannot simply talk about, or draw conclusions about, 
                                                          
 103. An overview of the process and decision points can be found in various 
FDA guidance documents. For an example, see DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 
53. A recent draft update to the 1998 guidance reiterates these decision points. 
 104. Benjamin A. Goldberger, Note, The Evolution of Substantial Equiva-
lence in FDA’s Premarket Review of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
317, 323–24 (2001) (describing the process a device seeking clearance through 
510K must pass). 
 105. See id. at 324. 
 106. Id.; see also Janice Hogan & Gwyn Simmons, Standards for Clearance 
of 510K Premarket Notifications in the US, RAJ DEVICES, 311–12 (Sept./Oct. 
2008), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/c6c923f0-742a-4b63-be7a-
eb10fc689261/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/db563313-55cf-4519-9c8a-
1417ccd17afb/RAJ.pdf (“[T]echnological characteristics [may include] design, 
materials and energy sources . . . .”). 
 107. Hogan & Simmons, supra note 106, at 311–12. 
 108. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a), 360d (2006). 
 109. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Goldberger, supra note 104, at 324. 
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the 510(k) system as one system throughout time. Rather, one 
must consider the system as it existed at the time the particu-
lar 510(k) submission was reviewed by the FDA. Conclusions 
about the nature of the 510(k) system as it existed in 1982 may 
well not be applicable to the 510(k) system as it exists today. 
This, we contend, is the fundamental challenge with the rote 
citation to Lohr for the proposition that today’s 510(k) system 
does not assess safety and effectiveness. 
C. PREEMPTION IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE CONTEXT. 
1. Federal Preemption of State Claim Under § 360k of the 
FDCA 
Preemption is the legal doctrine that federal requirements 
override similar state or local legal requirements.112 There are 
three general types of preemption. Express preemption re-
quires an explicit Congressional enactment.113 In these cases, 
the statutory language and Congressional intent define the 
boundaries and parameters of preemption.114 Implied preemp-
tion exists in situations in which Congress has so occupied a 
specific subject that courts conclude that Congress intended 
federal law to be the sole set of requirements.115 Conflict 
preemption (also called impossibility preemption) exists when a 
person or entity cannot comply with both a federal requirement 
and a state requirement.116 If a person or entity literally cannot 
comply with both federal and state requirements, federal re-
quirements predominate. 
From the beginning of medical device regulation with the 
enactment of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Con-
gress exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause and ex-
pressly preempted state-created medical device requirements. 
Section 360k(a) prohibits states from establishing device 
                                                          
 112. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 113. See Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 168 P.3d 
73, 79 (Nev. 2007) (“Congress expressly preempts state law when it explicitly 
states that intent in a statute’s language.”). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
 116. Id. 
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requirements additional to or different from those required by 
the FDA: Section 360k(a) reads: 
(a) General rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or po-
litical subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement— 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement appli-
cable under this Act to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under 
this Act.117 
This provision, enacted as a part of the 1976 Medical De-
vice Amendments, preempts state claims which establish either 
additional requirements or different requirements relating to 
the safety and effectiveness of devices under the FDCA. FDA’s 
implementing regulations limit preemption to situations in 
which the agency has device specific requirements and does not 
cover so-called “general requirements,” such as zoning laws, 
building codes, and tax obligations.118 In essence, § 360k 
preempts any state court requirement, including court cases, 
which impose or seek to impose requirements on medical devic-
es in situations in which the FDA has created or has the au-
thority to create device specific requirements relating to safety 
and effectiveness. 
While the Court in Lohr established that § 360k(a) “ex-
pressly preempts state law, “it acknowledged that § 360k(a) 
was not intended to preempt all state laws and regulations.119 
The Court reasoned that “any understanding of the scope of a 
preemption statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understand-
ing of congressional purpose.’”120 “Congress’ intent, of course, 
primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-emption 
statute and the ‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.”121 
2. Court Analysis in Medtronic v. Lohr 
The Supreme Court first applied preemption to medical 
devices under § 360k in 1996 in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. The 
                                                          
 117. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). 
 118. 21 C.F.R § 808.1(b), (d) (2011). 
 119. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996); see 21 U.S.C. § 
360k(a). 
 120. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485–86 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530). 
 121. Id. at 486 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment)). 
010 HALL MERCER_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:23 PM 
2012] RETHINKING LOHR 757 
device at issue in Lohr was the lead for a cardiac pacemaker—a 
wire responsible for carrying electric impulses or signals to and 
from the heart. 122 Medtronic produced the pacemaker lead, and 
the FDA cleared it for distribution under the 510(k) process of 
the MDA.123 The device was cleared by the FDA in 1982.124 Due 
to an alleged defect in the lead, the pacemaker system failed 
several years after it was implanted.125 The plaintiffs sued 
Medtronic asserting common law product liability theories.126 
Medtronic argued that the plaintiff’s defective device claim was 
preempted under the FDCA, asserting that “federally enforcea-
ble design requirement[s] cannot be affected by state-law pres-
sures such as those imposed on manufacturers subject to prod-
uct liability suits.”127 The Court rejected this claim and 
ultimately held that, because the 510(k) process that was in 
place when the device was reviewed by the FDA does not focus 
on safety and effectiveness, but rather on equivalence, the 
plaintiff’s defective device claim was not preempted by federal 
law.128 
3. History of the Pacemaker Lead in Dispute 
The pacemaker system at the center of the Lohr dispute 
was a Model 8403 Activitrax with a Model 4011 lead.129 In 
1980, Model 4011 leads were classified as Class III devices.130 
Shortly thereafter, in 1982, Medtronic submitted an application 
to have a Model 4011 lead cleared through 510(k), claiming 
substantial equivalence to a pre-1976 device.131 Approximately 
one month later, the FDA allowed Medtronic to “market the 
Model 4011 lead subject only to the MDA’s Class I general con-
                                                          
 122. Id. at 493 (ultimately determining that the 510k process does not as-
sess the safety of the device, but just the device’s equivalence to its predicate). 
 123. Id. at 474. 
 124. Id. at 480. 
 125. Id. at 474. 
 126. Id. at 481. 
 127. Id. at 492. 
 128. Id. at 503. 
 129. Mary Elizabeth Phelen, When a Pacemaker Or Other Medical Device 
Fails: Does Federal Law Deprive Those Injured of Their State Law Remedies?, 
1995–1996 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 365, 366. A pacemaker lead “is a wire 
connected to the pacemaker that delivers the electrical impulse to the heart.” 
Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. (demonstrating that, given the timeline, neither the pre-
amendment pacemaker, nor the pacemaker cleared through the substantial 
equivalence process were ever reviewed for safety and effectiveness). 
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trols applicable to all devices.”132 Medtronic continued making 
leads, piggy-backing on predecessors and obtaining clearances 
through the 510(k) system.133 As summarized in a 1992 gov-
ernment report that reviewed multiple failures of Medtronic 
pacemakers, the FDA never determined Medtronic’s 4011 leads 
to be either safe or effective.134 Ms. Lohr was implanted with 
Medtronic’s pacemaker system using the 4011 lead in 1987.135 
Medtronic’s central defense in Lohr was an assertion of 
federal preemption under § 360k(a) of the FDCA.136 Medtronic 
asserted that Lohr’s design claim was preempted because the 
FDA, by way of clearance under 510(k), already promulgated 
federally enforceable design requirements for Medtronic’s 
pacemaker.137 Therefore, Medtronic argued, Lohr’s action for 
negligent design was attempting to enforce an additional and 
contrary requirement to an FDA established requirement.138 In 
rejecting Medtronic’s preemption argument, the Court conclud-
ed that the 510(k) process did not assess safety or efficacy of 
the device and that manufacturers entering the market under 
510(k) clearance should expect “the possibility that [they will] 
have to defend [themselves] against state-law claims of negli-
gent design.”139 Additionally, the Court found the “general con-
trols” governing the pacemaker lead were not “specific re-
quirements applicable to a particular device under the act,” but 
instead were generic provisions that apply to all devices regu-
lated under the FDCA.140 
Given that the device in question was cleared by the FDA 
in 1982, the Court in Lohr only mentions the 1990 SMDA in 
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 367. Just to note, the SMDA required pre-1976 device manufac-
turers to submit safety and effectiveness reports for review by FDA. Before the 
SMDA, the safety and effectiveness of many pre-1976 devices was undeter-
mined. Cf. Section II.A.2 detailing the SMDA. 
 136. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 494. 
 140. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2011); Suzanne Darrow Kleinhaus, Medtronic v. 
Lohr: For Want of a Word, the Patient Was Almost Lost—Fixing the Mischief 
Caused in Cipollone by Dividing the Preemption Stream, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 
297, 305 (1998); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500 n. 18 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) 
(1995)). 
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passing and certainly does not analyze preemption under the 
post-SMDA regulatory system. Lohr left open the question of 
whether products going through the PMA process under 21 
U.S.C. § 360e were entitled to preemption. This question was 
answered by the Supreme Court in 2008. 
D. HOLDING IN RIEGEL V. MEDTRONIC, INC. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court again applied preemption to a 
medical device product liability claim in Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc.141 The device at the center of the dispute in Riegel was an 
Evergreen Balloon Catheter used for an angioplasty procedure 
for Charles Riegel in 1999.142 The catheter was a Class III de-
vice and received FDA approval under the PMA process in 
1994.143 The catheter’s labeling specified that the catheter 
should not be used in patients with calcified stenosis.144 Mr. 
Riegel had calcified stenosis.145 Furthermore, the physician was 
instructed not to inflate the balloon beyond eight atmospheres 
of pressure.146 Contrary to what the label of the catheter in-
structed, Riegel’s catheter was inflated five times to ten atmos-
pheres—well above the recommended pressure.147 On the fifth 
time, the balloon burst, injuring Mr. Riegel.148 As a result, a 
heart block developed and emergency coronary bypass surgery 
was required.149 Mr. Riegel brought suit against Medtronic al-
leging design defects and labeling problems in violation of New 
                                                          
 141. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 142. Id. at 312 . Angioplasty is a procedure during which blocked coronary 
arteries are opened by inflating a balloon inside the arterial blockage thus 
forcing the artery open. The balloon is attached to a catheter and inserted into 
the appropriate coronary artery. The balloon is then inflated opening the ar-
tery. Once the artery is open, the catheter and attached balloon are removed. 
See What is Coronary Angioplasty?, NAT’L HEART LUNG & BLOOD INST., 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/angioplasty/ (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2012). 
 143. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 312. The Court described the PMA process as in-
cluding, among many other facets, a thorough evaluation of the safety and ef-
fectiveness of the device. Id. at 318. The Court also noted that once a device is 
approved through PMA, the FDA “forbids . . . changes in design specifications . 
. . or any other attribute . . . .” Id. at 319. 
 144. Id. at 320. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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York common law.150 
In contrasting the facts of the situation in Riegel with 
those in Lohr, the Riegel Court found that “premarket approval 
is specific to individual devices” and “is focused on safety, not 
equivalence.”151 Since Mr. Riegel’s product liability claims fo-
cused on the safety and effectiveness of the catheter, and the 
FDA already specified requirements for that same catheter, the 
Court concluded the New York common law imposed different 
or additional requirements on the device.152 The FDCA was 
thus found to preempt Riegel’s claim for negligent design and 
faulty product labeling.153 
E. PROMINENT FDA PREEMPTION DECISIONS AFTER RIEGEL 
In a recent Supreme Court case, Wyeth v. Levine, the Court 
again faced a question of federal preemption in a product liabil-
ity suit.154 In Wyeth, the FDA approved drug—Phenergan—
presented an increased risk of gangrene if used by injection ra-
ther than intravenous drip.155 Phenergan contained an ade-
quate warning label per FDCA requirements; yet, when the 
plaintiff lost her arm due to gangrene, the FDCA was found not 
to preempt a state law product liability claim.156 At first blush, 
the holding in Wyeth seems contrary to the holding in Riegel. 
The key difference is that medical device preemption cases are 
analyzed under express preemption concepts due to § 360k. 
Drug cases are analyzed under implied preemption concepts.157 
The Court in Wyeth explicitly noted that a drug equivalent 
preemption provision to the medical device preemption set 
forth in § 360k(a) was non-existent.158 In citing Riegel, the 
                                                          
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 323. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 323–24.The Court in Riegel did not discuss the impact of the 
1990 SMDA on 510(k) preemption. 
 154. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 573–81. 
 157. The specific differences between express and implied preemption have 
been addressed by courts and commentators. Given that we focus on § 360k 
and express preemption, these differences are not relevant to our analysis. 
 158. Section 360k preempts a state from supplying additional or contrary 
requirements for medical devices. Contra Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (stating that it was possible for Wyeth to label Phenergan in com-
pliance with the FDA regulations and also provide additional warnings re-
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Court concluded that in an implied preemption case, unless 
there was a “direct and positive conflict” between state law and 
the FDCA, state common law suits were not preempted.159 In 
Wyeth, the Court determined it was possible for the drug manu-
facturer to comply with both state and federal law.160 While the 
FDA has authority to reject the drug label change, the drug 
manufacturer, not the FDA, is responsible for maintaining its 
labeling. It is important to distinguish drug and device cases. 
Wyeth concerned a drug, not a device; medical device preemp-
tion is analyzed under express preemption concepts and § 360k. 
Conversely, drug preemption is analyzed under implied 
preemption doctrine, and devices and drugs have unique regu-
latory structures. 
In PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, another federal preemption 
case, two consumers brought a products liability action under 
state tort law against a generic drug manufacturer.161 They al-
leged that the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warn-
ings on their generic drug labels.162 The key issue in Mensing 
was whether a generic drug manufacturer could change their 
drug’s labeling in accordance with state law requirements after 
initial FDA approval.163 Under FDA regulation, a generic drug 
manufacturer must contact the FDA if they believe new safety 
information should be added to their drug’s label.164 The FDA 
                                                          
quired by the state). This is unique to drugs as they have their own regulatory 
scheme. 
 159. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 
312, 342 (2008)); see also Matthew S. Reid, Comment, Vermont Supreme Court 
Rules That Food and Drug Administration Regulations Do Not Preempt State 
Failure-to-Warn Claims—Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006)., 4 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 413, 420 (2008) (noting that the FDA regulation of drug 
labeling only sets a floor; states’ requirements imposing greater labeling re-
quirements for drugs are enforceable); see generally 21 C.F.R § 314.70 (2011) 
(codifying minimum requirements for drug labels). 
 160. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568. In particular, the court focused on the “chang-
es being effected” or “CBE” provisions found in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). Id. 
 161. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011). 
 162. Id. State tort law—Minnesota and Louisiana in this case—requires “a 
drug manufacturer that is or should be aware of its product’s danger to label 
that product in a way that renders it reasonably safe.” Id. at 2573. 
 163. Id. at 2574. Just to note, under FDA regulations, generic drugs must 
have identical labels to their name brand counterparts. See Abbreviated New 
Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950-01 (Apr. 28, 1992) (codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, & 433) 
 164. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17950-
01 (Apr. 28, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, & 433). 
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then determines if the drug labeling should be strengthened.165 
Due to these FDA requirements, the Court in Mensing found 
conflict preemption; it was impossible for the generic drug 
manufacturer to comply with state law and strengthen their 
warning, while remaining in compliance with the federal 
law.166 
Mensing raised an additional question as to whether con-
flict preemption should consider situations where the FDA had 
the authority to act but did not act. For example, in Mensing 
the appellees argued that successfully proving preemption re-
quires the generic drug manufacturer to show that the FDA 
would not have allowed compliance with both state and federal 
law.167 In this case, it was at least possible that the FDA would 
have allowed the generic drug manufacturer to strengthen 
their drug label had they asked the FDA.168 The Court ruled, 
however, that the Supremacy Clause does not permit this ap-
proach to preemption. “The Supremacy Clause, on its face, 
makes federal law ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ even absent 
an express statement by Congress.”169 The Court ultimately 
held that federal law preempted the state law that required a 
change in the generic drug company’s label, despite the fact 
that the FDA had the authority to approve a stronger warning 
label.170 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. SUMMARY OF PREEMPTION ELEMENTS UNDER § 360K AND 
RELEVANT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
If one consolidates the medical device related preemption 
statutory elements under § 360k, the FDA’s implementing reg-
ulations under 21 C.F.R. § 808, and relevant Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, one can derive a core set of requirements or el-
                                                          
 165. Id. 
 166. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. at 2577–79. “The question for ‘impossibility’ is 
whether the private party could independently do under federal law what 
state law requires of it.” Id. at 2579. In Mensing, the generic drug manufac-
turer could not strengthen its label in accordance with state law and still be in 
compliance with federal law. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2578–79 
 168. Id. at 2587. 
 169. Id. at 2579. 
 170. Id. at 2582. 
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ements that must be satisfied before the courts will accept a 
preemption defense.171 
1. Required Preemption Elements  
First, the FDA must have the authority to impose safety 
and effectiveness related requirements on the device in ques-
tion.172 Section 360k preempts a state requirement that “re-
lates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other 
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device un-
der this chapter.”173 The core finding in Lohr was that the FDA, 
at the time it cleared Medtronic’s 4011 lead, did not impose, or 
have the authority to impose, safety and effectiveness require-
ments on the product. The Lohr Court found that the FDA had 
not made a safety or effectiveness determination when it 
cleared the pacemaker lead at issue. Conversely, in Riegel, the 
Supreme Court held that the PMA system in place when the 
catheter at issue in that case was approved did make a safety 
and effectiveness determination.174 Thus, one key element for a 
preemption defense is to establish that the regulatory system 
through which the product was permitted to be marketed 
makes, or has the authority to make, a safety and effectiveness 
determination.175 
                                                          
 171. It is not our intent to debate or analyze the correctness of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of § 360k in Lohr or Riegel. We recognize that some (in-
cluding some dissenting judges) question various aspects of Supreme Court 
preemption jurisdiction. For example, there have been debates whether a state 
product liability verdict is a “requirement” within the meaning of the “parallel 
claim” language in Riegel; whether there should be preemption for IDE prod-
ucts; or what is the relationship of preemption cases such as Riegel to 
Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, and Buckman’s “fraud on the FDA” 
language. See Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 172. The issue of whether the FDA has the authority to impose require-
ments is different from the question whether a state court product liability 
verdict is a “requirement” for preemption purposes. In several cases, including 
Lohr and Riegel, the Supreme Court determined that state court product lia-
bility verdicts can be “requirements” for preemption purposes. 
 173. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2) (2006). 
 174. See Section II.E. Preemption applies if the agency has the statutory 
and regulatory authority necessary to satisfy the requirements of § 360k. 
Preemption applies even if the agency makes the wrong safety or effectiveness 
determination or otherwise inadequately implements the statutory authority 
given it. Preemption is a question of agency authority, not agency implementa-
tion or agency decision-making. 
 175. Because product liability cases almost universally involve questions of 
safety, the role of the regulatory system in making effectiveness determina-
tions is rarely an issue. 
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Second, the agency must have the authority to impose the 
regulatory requirements that are specific to the device. For ex-
ample, in Lohr, the defendant argued that the “general con-
trols”176 applicable to the pacemaker lead were safety and effec-
tiveness determinations. The Court rejected this argument 
because, in the Court’s opinion, general controls applied to all 
devices without regard for the particular nature or features of 
the actual device.177 Conversely, the Supreme Court held that 
the PMA requirements at issue in Riegel were specific to the 
device because each PMA individually analyzes a device and so 
satisfied this element of preemption. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court looked at the statutory provisions178 requiring a 
safety and effectiveness determination by the FDA for any 
PMA submission and the content of the application and ap-
proval documents.179 The Court was also heavily influenced by 
the fact that the company could not make product changes 
without prior FDA review and approval.180 
Cases such as Wyeth and Mensing turned on whether the 
company could modify the product in question or the product 
labeling without prior FDA approval. The idea is that the ina-
bility of the company to unilaterally make product changes 
demonstrates both that the FDA is fully occupying the field (a 
necessary part of implied or field preemption) and demon-
strates that the proposed change in the product is a new re-
quirement that is different from or in addition to FDA require-
ments—a key element of preemption under § 360k. The statute 
(§ 360k) itself does not explicitly create this “specificity” ele-
ment. The statute simply talks about safety and effectiveness. 
The Court in Lohr used the FDA’s implementing regula-
tions as a key basis for the specificity requirement. Chapter 21 
                                                          
 176. General controls include manufacturing systems (so-called good man-
ufacturing practices (GMPs)), quality system regulations (QSRs), and facility 
and device registration. The role of general controls in product safety is set 
forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 177. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1996). 
 178. 21 U.S.C. § 360e sets out detailed requirements for the content of a 
PMA submission and the criteria by which the agency approves or rejects the 
application. 
 179. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 313 (2008). 
 180. Contra Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1196 (2009) (discussing how 
a drug company was able to make changes to the drug labeling without FDA 
approval through the CBE regulation). The CBE provision is not available to 
device manufacturers under the 510(k) provisions. 
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C.F.R. § 808.1(d) states: 
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and 
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations 
or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular de-
vice under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or lo-
cal requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition 
to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 
In addition, in its implementing regulations, the FDA ex-
plicitly stated that state requirements that are of general ap-
plicability are not preempted by § 360k.181 The purpose of the 
“specificity” requirement appears to be to permit local non-
device requirements to be effective. Examples of requirements 
of general applicability include local zoning requirements, elec-
trical codes, and permitting requirements. 
These regulatory and statutory provisions, together with 
the Court’s overall view on preemption, led to the Court assert-
ing that in order for there to be preemption, the FDA must im-
pose, or have the power to impose, device specific requirements 
relating to safety and effectiveness. 
Many medical device preemption cases involve allegations 
that the product should have warnings or safety features not 
required by the FDA. Preemption exists if the FDA had the au-
thority to impose such obligations but did not do so. These are 
covered by the “in addition to” clause of § 360k. The fact that 
the FDA did not impose a requirement is irrelevant if the FDA 
had the authority to impose that requirement. 
Third, only state requirements that are “different from, or 
in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to 
the device” are preempted.182 Product liability claims that are 
“parallel” to FDA requirements are not preempted.183  
 
2. Understanding the Meaning of “Different from” and “in 
Addition to” 
Section 360k(a)(1) requires preemption (assuming all other 
conditions for preemption have been met) in two situations. 
                                                          
 181. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1), (3), (6) (2011). 
 182. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006). 
 183. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. The definition of what is “parallel” and the 
intersection between the “parallel claim” language in Riegel and the prohibi-
tion of private causes of action under Buckman is outside of the scope of this 
article. We note that under 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) “a State or local re-
quirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices” 
is not preempted—presumably as long as it is a “parallel” claim under Riegel. 
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First, there is preemption in situations in which the FDA has 
affirmatively created device specific requirements that are “dif-
ferent from” the plaintiff’s claim or the jury’s decision. While 
this situation can generally be analyzed as express preemption, 
it also can be viewed as conflict preemption. If the FDA re-
quires a two-inch wire and the plaintiff is asserting that the 
wire should be one-inch,184 one can find either express preemp-
tion under § 360k (the “different from” prong of 21 U.S.C. 
360k(a)(1)) or conflict preemption because the defendant literal-
ly could not comply with both requirements at the same time. 
These “different from” or conflict cases are not common. 
Most preemption cases since Lohr have involved situations 
in which the plaintiff is asserting that the defendant should 
have done something more than what the FDA required under 
the PMA or cleared under the 510(k).185 This can include, for 
example, assertions that additional warnings should have been 
given, or some part of the device could have been designed in a 
more robust fashion. These cases are not conflict preemption 
cases because, for example, the plaintiff argues the defendant 
could physically have added the warning without contradicting 
any actual FDA mandated warning. Rather, these cases must 
be analyzed under the “in addition to” prong of §360k(a)(1). 
These “in addition to” cases involve situations in which the 
FDA had the statutory authority to compel the defendant to do 
whatever the plaintiff asserts should have been done, but the 
FDA did not compel the additional warning or different design. 
For example, in the PMA context, the courts recognize that the 
FDA could have compelled additional warnings as part of the 
PMA approval process.186 In this PMA context, the state re-
quirement is “in addition to” whatever FDA actually required 
and thus is preempted. 
The key is that the “in addition to” prong of § 360k covers 
all situations in which the FDA has the power to act but has 
                                                          
 184. This is Justice Breyer’s famous example in his concurrence in part and 
concurrence in the result in Lohr. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 504 
(1996). 
 185. See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, 105 F.3d 1090 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Webster v. Pacesetter, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 186. Many products are modifications of PMA products and so go through a 
supplemental PMA process. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2011). For our purposes, 
there is no meaningful difference between an original PMA and a supple-
mental PMA. Courts have not found any difference for preemption purposes. 
See, e.g., Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 760 N.W.2d 396, 405–08 (Wis. 2009). 
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not done so for whatever reason. Section 360k clearly creates 
minimum standards. If the FDA requires a warning on the la-
bel and the defendant fails to include that warning, the plain-
tiff may well have a relatively easy “parallel claim” case (as-
suming proximate causation and all of the other traditional 
requirements of a product liability case). However, the FDA 
does much more than simply create minimum standards. The 
FDA also creates maximum standards. A product approval is a 
balancing act. Different designs and different warnings create 
different advantages and disadvantages. Adding a warning can, 
for example, actually cause harm as patients and physicians 
change prescribing habits. 187 A classic example of this occurred 
when new teen suicide warnings were added to serotonin-
specific reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)—a type of antidepressant. 
Actual product use decreased and the number of suicides in-
creased.188 
The FDA has been authorized by Congress to make these 
balances. Permitting state product liability cases to impose ad-
ditional requirements undermines this authority. Thus, the “in 
addition to” prong of § 360k preempts a state court from impos-
ing other design, labeling, or manufacturing requirements. 
Preemption covers the ability to impose requirements, not just 
the existence of a requirement. 
3. If Modifications Require FDA Approval, Preemption Exists 
A key question in a medical device product liability case is 
whether a manufacturer is permitted to make some design 
change or change in warnings for a 510(k) product without pri-
or FDA concurrence. 
In determining whether the FDA has the right to impose 
both the minimum and maximum requirements, courts often 
look at whether the change being proposed by the plaintiff 
could be implemented without FDA approval. If FDA approval 
is needed, then courts generally hold that there is preemption. 
This approach is best demonstrated by Wyeth v. Levine.189 In 
this drug product liability case, the Supreme Court was faced 
with an implied preemption argument.190 The plaintiff argued 
                                                          
 187. See generally Ralph F. Hall, The Risk of Risk Reduction: Can 
Postmarket Surveillance Pose More Risk than Benefit?, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
473, 485–87 (2007) (describing the reduction of SSRI use and FDA’s response). 
 188. Id. at 486. 
 189. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009). 
 190. There is no statutory equivalent to § 360k in the drug provisions of the 
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that Wyeth should have added new or additional warnings to it 
label for the drug in question. The defendant countered by ar-
guing that its label was FDA approved. The Supreme Court 
sided with the plaintiff and found that Wyeth could have uni-
laterally added the warning advocated by the plaintiff using 
the “changes being effected” (CBE) process set forth in the drug 
regulations.191 
The Supreme Court continued to follow this approach 
when it found preemption in a generic drug case because the 
generic drug manufacturing was not covered by the CBE provi-
sions applicable to the name brand. As a result, the generic 
drug company could not make any change without prior FDA 
approval, and the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim was preempt-
ed.192 In essence, a requirement is specific to a device (or drug) 
if the manufacturer could not change or modify the product to 
address that requirement without prior FDA approval. 
This question is directly answered for 510(k) products by 
existing FDA regulations and guidance, which establish that 
changes to 510(k) products intended to address safety or effec-
tiveness issues or which could substantially affect safety or ef-
fectiveness cannot be implemented without prior FDA review 
and clearance. Chapter 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) states: 
[E]ach person . . . must submit a premarket notification submission to 
the Food and Drug Administration at least 90 days before he proposes 
to begin the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate 
commerce for commercial distribution of a device intended for human 
use which meets any of the following criteria: 
. . . 
(3) The device is one that the person currently has in commercial 
distribution or is reintroducing into commercial distribution, but 
that is about to be significantly changed or modified in design, 
components, method of manufacture, or intended use. The follow-
ing constitute significant changes or modifications that require a 
premarket notification: 
(i) A change or modification in the device that could signifi-
cantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the device, e.g., a 
significant change or modification in design, material, chemi-
cal composition, energy source, or manufacturing process.193 
                                                          
FDCA. Courts, including Levine have used implied preemption doctrine as the 
basis for preemption arguments. 
 191. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6) (2008). 
 192. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011). 
 193. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2011) (emphasis added). 
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As stated in the regulation and accompanying guidance, a 
company must submit a new 510(k) whenever it wishes to 
make a change to an already cleared device and that change 
“could significantly affect the safety or effectiveness of the de-
vice.” 194 This places products under the 510(k) system in the 
same category as cases such as Mensing in which the Supreme 
Court found preemption in large part because the company 
could not make a product change without prior FDA approval. 
Likewise, this regulatory structure differentiates the 510(k) 
system from the new drug world of Levine in which the compa-
ny could make a change prior to FDA approval.195 
The same general requirements apply to PMA devices.196 A 
company cannot distribute a PMA product with a change that 
could affect safety or effectiveness.197 This fact supported the 
finding of preemption in Riegel. In that case the company 
couldn’t make the change required by the plaintiff’s theory 
                                                          
 194. Current guidance explaining and implementing these requirements 
can be found at: OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION, DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT 
A 510(K) FOR A CHANGE TO AN EXISTING DEVICE 1 (1997), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm080243.pdf. Note that the FDA has recently issued a 
draft update to this guidance. See, e.g., OFFICE OF DEVICE EVALUATION, 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—510(K) DEVICE MODIFICATIONS: 
DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT A 510(K) FOR A CHANGE TO AN EXISTING DEVICE 
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceReg 
ulationandGuidance/ GuidanceDocuments/UCM265349.pdf. This guidance is 
still in draft form. The differences between the 1997 guidance and the new 
draft guidance are not relevant to the question of whether the FDA has the 
authority to require a new 510(k) if a company is making a change that could 
significantly affect safety. 
 195. If a company does make a change to a 510(k) device and markets that 
product prior to FDA approval, the agency can always exercise its enforcement 
discretion and not bring an administrative, civil, or criminal action. It may 
well be that the FDA might, in certain circumstances decide not to bring an 
enforcement action. That enforcement discretion decision does not, however, 
magically make an illegal act legal. 
 196. The 510(k) system requires a submission if a change could significant-
ly affect safety. The PMA system requires a new submission for a change that 
could affect safety. While this linguistic difference is important to regulatory 
professionals, it is hard to imagine a product liability lawsuit in which the 
plaintiff argues that the defendant should have made a change, but that the 
change could not significantly affect safety. The causation basis of the plain-
tiff’s case is that his or her injuries were, in fact, caused by the failure to make 
the change advocated by the plaintiff. 
 197. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2008). Note that, unlike the 510(k) system, the 
PMA system can, in unusual circumstances, permit certain limited types of 
changes to be made while the FDA is reviewing the supplemental PMA. See 
id. 
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without prior FDA approval.198 The parallel modification re-
quirements for PMA and 510(k) devices further reinforces the 
conclusion that modern 510(k) products are under the Riegel 
rule, not the Lohr approach. 
The post Lohr regulatory system is consistent with well-
established Supreme Court preemption law. The manufacturer 
of a 510(k) product cannot make a change which could signifi-
cantly affect safety without prior FDA clearance of a new 
510(k) submission covering that change. Thus, preemption un-
der § 360k should apply. 
B. PREEMPTION UNDER § 360K—AND WHY LOHR DOES NOT 
APPLY TO CURRENT 510(K) PRODUCTS 
In Lohr, the Court conducted a statutory analysis of the 
510(k) system as it existed in 1982 and concluded that the 
FDCA did not preempt the plaintiff’s product liability claims.199 
However, the precedential impact of Lohr for 510(k) products 
cleared under the current system is highly questionable. This 
view is not based on an argument that Lohr itself was incor-
rectly decided. Rather, the medical device statutes have 
changed dramatically in the thirty years since 1982, and the 
courts cannot and should not ignore these changes. As such, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the 1982 510(k) system for 
preemption purposes is not outcome determinative for whether 
there is preemption under the 2012 510(k) system. 
In analyzing 510(k) preemption, it is important not to be 
misled by the date of the decision in Lohr. The Supreme Court’s 
decision was handed down in 1996. That is not the relevant 
date. The Court (quite correctly) analyzed the statutory system 
as it existed at the time the product in question was cleared by 
the FDA—that was in 1982. To understand the holding and 
limitations of Lohr one must look at the 510(k) system as it ex-
isted at that time.200 
                                                          
 198. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312–13 (2008). 
 199. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 503 (1996). 
 200. Interestingly—and in full support of this view—the Court in Lohr did 
not analyze the SMDA and its role in preemption. The Court only mentions 
the SMDA in two places: in footnote 3 of the case, which pointed out how the 
SMDA and subsequent FDA actions could change the regulatory classification 
of pacemakers, and in footnote 4, which also pointed out how the SMDA had 
changed the device regulatory system. Surely the Supreme Court would have 
reviewed the regulatory system post-SMDA if that had been relevant to the 
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A similar statutory interpretation of today’s FDCA, in con-
junction with the FDA’s own view of the 510(k) system and ac-
tual 510(k) clearance records, reveals that the 510(k) process 
does assess safety and effectiveness and that there are specific 
requirements for products. Therefore, the 510(k) system should 
preempt product liability claims against devices cleared under 
the current 510(k) system.201 
C. IMPACT OF THE SAFE MEDICAL DEVICE ACT OF 1990 
Medical technology and the clinical application of medical 
devices experienced a rapid expansion between the Medical 
Device Amendments in 1976 and the Safe Medical Devices Act 
of 1990 (SMDA). The introduction of new technologies and med-
ical devices required Congress and the FDA to modify the then 
existing regulatory system. In fact, the explicit purpose of the 
SMDA was to substantially enhance the oversight of medical 
devices including making major changes to the 510(k) process. 
Consistent with the Court’s analysis in Lohr, a statutory 
interpretation of §§ 360k and 513(i)202 should start with a fair 
understanding of congressional purpose of the current regula-
tory scheme. The lead at issue in Lohr predated the SMDA. If a 
similar situation arose today, the Court would analyze “sub-
stantial equivalence” as defined in the SMDA and subsequent 
congressional and regulatory enactments. 
In this instance, the purpose of Congress in enacting the 
SMDA is clear—the Act was to further a policy promoting the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices by providing a more 
stringent or robust regulatory frame to effectuate that pur-
pose.203 After the SMDA, the FDA had substantially more ro-
                                                          
case. The Court, quite correctly, looked only at the 1982 510(k) system. Lohr, 
thus, does not address the 510(k) system for products cleared after 1990. 
 201. As we discuss at length, at the relevant time for the Lohr analysis, the 
510(k) clearance process was different from the current process. We do not ar-
gue that Lohr was incorrectly decided, but rather, in light of the 510(k) clear-
ance process conducted today, Lohr does not control preemption cases involv-
ing products cleared today and a new standard should be applied in 510(k) 
product liability suits. 
 202. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act § 513(i), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3) (2006). Sec-
tion 513(i) now contains the provisions referring to substantial equivalence. 
 203. In 1997, the passage of the FDAMA furthered Congress’s purpose of 
increasing safety and effectiveness of market distributed products. See Linda 
A. Suydam & Milan J. Kubic, FDA’s Implementation of FDAMA: An Interim 
Balance Sheet, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 131, 131 (2001) (noting the “exceptional 
addition” FDAMA provided the FDA with statutory authority in addition to 
“reaffirming the agency’s vital importance for the protection of public health”). 
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bust authority to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical 
devices in furtherance of congressional policy. 
The 1982 510(k) system (based on the 1976 MDA) relied 
upon performance standards and a physical comparison of 
products as the means to provide the necessary reasonable as-
surance of safety and effectiveness. Instead of relying on per-
formance standards (an approach that turned out to be un-
wieldy), the SMDA instead utilized the concept of “special 
controls.”204 Special controls can include, among other require-
ments, clinical data, bench testing, satisfaction of consensus 
standards, use of specific materials, and post-market surveil-
lance.205 
The SMDA also added, for the first time, a statutory defini-
tion of substantial equivalence.206 The Supreme Court in Lohr 
did not face or decide the question of whether the new statutory 
definition of substantial equivalence, together with the added 
control mechanism provided by special controls, demonstrates 
that the post-1990 510(k) system does address safety and effec-
tiveness. The bottom line is that if the Medtronic lead at issue 
in Lohr was cleared through the 510(k) process of today’s statu-
tory framework—the more robust process created by the 
SMDA—there would be a much greater assessment of the safe-
ty and effectiveness of the lead. Under the current FDCA, the 
FDA has the statutory authority to impose special controls, re-
quire data submission, and make a clear determination of the 
safety and effectiveness of the lead prior to its clearance and 
market release. 
D. 510(K) ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS: 
OPINIONS OF THE FDA 
In Lohr, the Court concluded that the 1982 version of “the 
510(k) process was [not] intended to do anything other than 
maintain the status quo, which included the possibility that a 
device’s manufacturer would have to defend itself against state-
law negligent design claims.”207 At the time of Lohr, the FDA 
may have even agreed that there was no assessment for safety 
and effectiveness of a 510(k) device’s design. In contrast, the 
                                                          
 204. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 205. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2011). 
 206. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i). 
 207. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996). 
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FDA today asserts that after several “statutory and regulatory 
modifications over time, [the 510(k) system] has become a mul-
tifaceted premarket review process that . . . provide[s] reasona-
ble assurance of safety and effectiveness [and] facilitate[s] in-
novation in the medical device industry.”208 The 510(k) process 
is now the principal route used for medical devices to reach 
market.209 
The FDA’s assessment of the program it runs is critical. 
The FDA is neutral and has the greatest expertise. The agen-
cy’s mission is to protect public health and provide a reasonable 
assurance of safety and effectiveness. An effective 510(k) sys-
tem is obviously critical to that goal. 
1. The FDA Asserts That It Is Making Safety and Effectiveness 
Determinations for 510(k) Devices 
The FDA has very recently reaffirmed that today’s 510(k) 
system does assess safety and effectiveness. In December 2011, 
the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) issued 
a draft guidance regarding how it assesses “substantial equiva-
lence” under the 510(k) process.210 This draft guidance explicit-
ly states that the 510(k) program does assess safety and effec-
tiveness: 
Because devices are classified according to the level of regulatory con-
trol necessary to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effec-
tiveness, classification of a new device through the 510(k) process re-
quires FDA to determine the issues of safety and effectiveness 
presented by the new device, and the regulatory controls necessary to 
address those issues.211 
The FDA continues and states that “the principles of safety 
                                                          
 208. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, 510(K) WORKING GROUP 
PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, CDRH PRELIMINARY 
INTERNAL EVALUATIONS 34 (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM220784.pdf. 
 209. Heather S. Rosecrans, Dir., 510(k) Staff, When to Submit (or Not) a 
510K, That Is the Question!. Presentation at the AMDA/FDA-OVID Workshop 
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.amdm.org/presentations.html (follow “OVID Sub-
missions Workshop” hyperlink, download and open the .zip file, then open the 
“Rosecrans.pdf”). 
 210. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 1, 5−8. Note that guidance docu-
ments, including this Draft Guidance, do not and cannot create new policy. Id. 
at 1; see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2011). Rather, guidance documents further 
explain or describe existing policy and requirements. As such, the Draft Guid-
ance does not reflect any substantive changes in how the 510(k) system as-
sesses safety and effectiveness. Id. 
 211. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 3 (footnotes omitted). 
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and effectiveness underlie the substantial equivalence deter-
mination in every 510(k) review.”212 
What has confused some about the 510(k) system, in addi-
tion to the fundamental changes made to the system over thir-
ty-five years, is that the 510(k) system uses a different means 
to assess safety and effectiveness than does the PMA system. 
Each PMA is a separate review and does not require compari-
son to another device. The 510(k) system instead compares the 
device under review to another, already cleared device, for 
which a “reasonable assurance of[] safety and effectiveness” has 
already been demonstrated and uses special controls to impose 
safety and effectiveness requirements on product types.213 The 
2011 Draft Guidance explains this as follows: 
Although the 510(k) process involves a comparison of a new device to 
a predicate device rather than an independent demonstration of the 
new device’s safety and effectiveness, as is required for approval of a 
PMA, in both cases FDA’s review decision reflects a determination of 
the level of control necessary to provide a “reasonable assurance of 
safety and effectiveness.” The evidentiary standard, however, is differ-
ent. In the 510(k) context, FDA generally relies, in part, on FDA’s pri-
or determination that a reasonable assurance of safety and effective-
ness exists for the predicate device.214 
What could be clearer? The FDA specifically states that the 
current 510(k) system makes a safety and effectiveness deter-
mination. 
Section 360k does not limit or specify the way in which the 
FDA assesses device safety and effectiveness. Rather, it simply 
requires that the FDA do so in order for there to be preemption. 
Earlier guidance also confirms that, at least post-SMDA, the 
FDA does make a safety and effectiveness determination as 
part of the clearance process. A key guidance describing the 
510(k) system states: “Section 513(i) of the Act states that the 
FDA may issue an order of substantial equivalence only upon 
making a determination that the device to be introduced into 
commercial distribution is as safe and effective as a legally 
marketed device.”215 
                                                          
 212. Id. at 6. 
 213. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2011). 
 214. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 7 (emphasis added) (footnote ad-
mitted). 
 215. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, THE NEW 510(K) 
PARADIGM—ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL 
EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS —FINAL GUIDANCE 1 (1998), 
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Further evidence from the FDA’s own documents also 
demonstrates that the FDA is making a safety and effective-
ness finding for 510(k) devices. First, in September of 2007, the 
CDRH, the department in charge of overseeing medical device 
regulation, released to the public a guidance document provid-
ing direction to reviewers and industry alike on the use of na-
tional consensus standards in medical device evaluation. In 
this guidance document, CDRH explicitly states that it “be-
lieves that conformance with recognized consensus standards 
[a means of showing substantial equivalence under the 510(k) 
system] can support a reasonable assurance of safety and/or ef-
fectiveness for many applicable aspects of medical devices.”216 
Again, in December 2011, the CDRH published a draft 
guidance document detailing the current “statutory framework” 
of the 510(k) clearance process.217 Issued as recommendations 
for the future of 510(k), this guidance document makes clear 
that the FDA is not only currently conducting a safety and ef-
fectiveness determination for 510(k) devices, but that safety 
and effectiveness are at the crux of 510(k) clearance decisions. 
For instance, when describing the 510(k) review standard, the 
CDRH states that “[s]afety and effectiveness factor into both 
parts of [the 510(k)] review standard.”218 The guidance docu-
ment goes on to conclude that “in both cases [PMA and 510(k) 
review] FDA’s review decision reflects a determination of the 
level of control necessary to provide a ‘reasonable assurance of 
safety and effectiveness.’”219 
In addition to specific statements found in guidance docu-
ments, the requirements for the content of a 510(k) submission 
establish that a safety and effectiveness determination is tak-
ing place. The CDRH’s regulations detail what the sponsor of a 
                                                          
available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance 
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm080187.htm. 
 216. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—RECOGNITION AND USE OF CONSENSUS 
STANDARDS 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm077295.pdf [hereinafter CONSENSUS STANDARDS]. 
 217. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 3; see CONSENSUS STANDARDS, 
supra note 216, at 4−5 (reinforcing that the 510(k) provision is in place to 
promote the FDA’s public health mission by ensuring devices are safe and ef-
fective when marketed. The CDRH also recognizes that past implementations 
of the 510(k) may have failed to adequately achieve this goal). 
 218. DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 7. 
 219. Id. 
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510(k) must submit in order to obtain clearance. Among other 
requirements, the sponsor is required to submit to CDRH a 
summary of safety and effectiveness or a 510(k) statement.220 
Chapter 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(a) states that for a finding of sub-
stantial equivalence, “[a] 510(k) summary shall be [submitted] 
in sufficient detail to provide an understanding of the basis for 
a determination of substantial equivalence.”221 More specifical-
ly, Congress requires that a 510(k) submission “shall provide 
an adequate summary of any information respecting safety and 
effectiveness or state that such information will be made avail-
able upon request by any person.”222 This 510(k) statement or 
summary of safety and effectiveness is also made available to 
the public within thirty days of a substantial equivalence deci-
sion for the 510(k). 223 Furthermore, the FDA requires the 
510(k) submitter—if they choose to submit a 510(k) summary 
in lieu of a 510(k) statement to submit “[t]he conclusions drawn 
from the nonclinical and clinical tests that demonstrate that 
the device is as safe, as effective, and performs as well as or 
better than the legally marketed device identified[as a predi-
cate device].”224 The requisite scientific evidence includes per-
formance data—both clinical and nonclinical tests—that were 
used by the manufacturer.225 Remember that this type of in-
formation historically was only required for PMA devices and 
was not required for Medtronic’s 4011 lead to prove substantial 
equivalence. Today, the FDA may also request additional in-
formation prior to clearing the device for market if the infor-
mation has relevance to the FDA’s review; namely, the FDA re-
views “all available safety and effectiveness information” 
available for the medical device.226 
Thus the requisite basis and additional scientific infor-
mation submitted with every 510(k) submission substantiates 
the FDA’s safety and effectiveness determination because the 
basis of clearance requires evidence demonstrating that the de-
                                                          
 220. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (2011). 
 221. Id. (emphasis added). 
 222. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A) (2006). 
 223. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(B). 
 224. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(b)(3). 
 225. See id. (requiring only data that show substantial equivalence). This 
contrasts the PMA process where such clinical studies are required to show 
safety and effectiveness. 
 226. CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 208, at 73. 
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vice operates similarly to its predicate, and that the device is 
safe and effective for its intended purpose. The FDA’s imple-
menting regulations reinforce these requirements. 
The Office of Device Evaluation and the Office of In Vitro 
Diagnostics also explicitly states new devices are “not substan-
tially equivalent” if they do not demonstrate they are at least 
as safe and effective, if not more so, as their predicate.227 It log-
ically follows that to determine whether a device is “at least as 
safe and effective” as the predicate device, one must determine 
how safe and effective the new device is. When is the FDA de-
termines that a 510(k) device is “at least as safe and effective” 
as its predicate, that determination is a conclusion that the de-
vice is sufficiently safe and effective for clearance.228 Stated dif-
ferently, a clearance is granted when the FDA believes the 
510(k) sponsor has provided information to provide reasonable 
assurance of the device’s safety and effectiveness in order to 
demonstrate substantial equivalence. Consistent with this con-
clusion, § 360k should apply to 510(k) product liability claims; 
both PMA and 510(k) cases should be analyzed using the 
standard in Riegel. 
When taken together, the current 510(k) system is unlike 
that in place at the time of Lohr. In Lohr, no evidence of safety 
and effectiveness was required for the Model 4011 Lead. Medi-
cal devices manufacturers now must produce such evidence 
demonstrating a finding of safety and effectiveness that is then 
reviewed by the FDA.229 The FDA has the authority to impose 
new special controls over 510(k) products to provide reasonable 
assurance of safety and effectiveness even if there are identical 
predicates. The FDA has demonstrated that it is making this 
determination of safety and effectiveness and has the authority 
to impose safety requirements, thereby preempting any sort of 
alternative, state-based claim. 
                                                          
 227. Rosecrans, supra note 209, at 41. 
 228. The actual statutory standard for permitting a medical device is that 
“there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness” of the device. 21 
U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(C) (2006). This standard applies to all medical device clas-
ses. The statute does not require absolute safety. Rather, products are re-
viewed on a risk/benefit basis. If the benefits outweigh the risks, the product 
should be approved or cleared. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2) (2006). 
 229. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (detailing all that is required for a device manufac-
turer to submit in their 510(k) summary). 
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2. FDA’s Assessment of the 510(k) System Deserves Deference 
The statutory provisions creating the 510(k) system may, 
at first blush, appear confusing and obtuse. Because the cur-
rent 510(k) system is the result of numerous statutory changes 
over thirty-five years, it can be difficult to easily understand. In 
fact, the actual words of § 510(k) seem to have little to do with 
the system that is actually in place.230 However, as shown 
above, when analyzed in detail, the 510(k) system clearly ad-
dresses device safety and effectiveness. 
However, if one concludes that the statutory language is 
not completely clear or is otherwise ambiguous in some way, 
the FDA’s interpretation of the statute must be given substan-
tial deference. The agency is the expert and is charged by Con-
gress with implementing the statutory provisions and mission. 
Unless unreasonable, long settled Supreme Court precedent 
mandates that the FDA’s statements regarding the legal sche-
ma established through the 510(k) system, which makes safety 
and effectiveness determinations, must be accepted.231 This is 
particularly true given the consistency of the Agency’s imple-
mentation of the 510(k) system and the alignment of the agen-
cy’s interpretation and implementation with its congressionally 
mandated mission. 
The FDA’s interpretation that the post-1990 510(k) system 
does assess safety and effectiveness is bolstered by Congres-
sional action (and inaction) since 1990. Lohr was decided in 
1996. If the agency or Congress believed that the post-1990 
510(k) system ignored device safety, it would be amazing if they 
did not change the system. Is it logical that Congress and the 
FDA would permit literally tens of thousands of medical devic-
es requiring 510(k) review to be marketed without a safety and 
effectiveness assessment? It seems highly unlikely. And re-
member that Congress has made various changes to the medi-
cal device statutes since Lohr. In fact, the year after Lohr was 
decided, Congress made a number of highly substantive chang-
                                                          
 230. One can debate whether we should call this the 513(i) system rather 
than the 510(k) system. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. However, 
for historical reasons, everyone, including Congress, refers to this as the 
510(k) system. 
 231. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth the standard for when to grant deference to 
a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute the agency is responsible for ad-
ministering). 
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es to the medical device provisions when it enacted the FDA 
Modernization Act (FDAMA).232 This would have been the per-
fect time to add safety and effectiveness requirements to the 
510(k) system if such provisions were lacking. 
Unless one believes that Congress either did not notice the 
Lohr decision or did not want medium risk devices assessed for 
safety and effectiveness, the only logical explanation as to why 
Congress or the FDA didn’t change—or even try to change—the 
core 510(k)/substantial equivalence/special controls approach to 
510(k) device regulation is that Congress already addressed 
those issues with the 1990 SMDA. 
Congressional action and the deference given to an agen-
cy’s interpretation of its enabling statutes provide strong sup-
port for a conclusion that the 510(k) system does assess safety 
and effectiveness and that Lohr is not blindly applicable to 
products cleared under today’s 510(k) system. 
E. CERTAIN (BUT CERTAINLY NOT ALL) THIRD PARTIES ALSO 
BELIEVE 510(K) CLEARANCES UNDERGO A SAFETY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT. 
A number of third parties have opined, in one form or an-
other, on whether the 510(k) system as currently enacted by 
Congress gives the FDA the authority to consider safety and ef-
fectiveness in making 510(k) decisions. Many of these third 
parties have referenced the role of the FDA as providing rea-
sonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of 510(k) 
cleared products. A number of others have made very different 
and contrary statements.233 
In assessing these statements or positions, it is imperative 
to separate views on the authority Congress has given to the 
FDA from issues or disagreements with the FDA’s use of that 
authority in the implementation of the 510(k) program. Author-
ity issues are the key preemption question—if the Agency does 
not have the authority to regulate safety and effectiveness of a 
medical device, then there is no preemption given the language 
and requirements of § 360(k).234 If the FDA has the authority to 
                                                          
 232. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 233. One must consider factors such as the potential biases of these third 
parties, their expertise, and the robustness of the review they performed be-
fore deciding what weight to give to any such positions. 
 234. Lohr itself is the classic example of this difference between authority 
and implementation questions. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). In 
Lohr, the Court found that the FDA did not have the statutory authority to 
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require whatever the plaintiff believes should have been done, 
but simply did not do so for whatever reason, there is preemp-
tion. Implementation problems or disagreements are not rele-
vant to preemption.235 One might believe that the FDA made a 
mistake, missed some problem, or should have added a warning 
to a product. However, the FDA preemption is explicitly de-
signed to ensure that the agency—not a state court jury—
makes those decisions. Many criticisms from all sides address 
implementation issues, not authority issues, and therefore are 
not relevant to preemption issues. 
While this article is not intended to present a detailed re-
view of the secondary literature surrounding the actual imple-
mentation of the 510(k) system, several examples on both sides 
of the question may be of interest. 
1. Institute of Medicine Is Critical of the 510(k) System 
One of the most publicized criticisms of the 510(k) system 
came from an Institute of Medicine (IOM)236 report issued in 
July 2011.237 The IOM was commissioned by the FDA to con-
duct an analysis of the 510(k) regulatory scheme.238 In addition 
                                                          
make safety and effectiveness decisions. Id. at 493−94. The Court’s decision in 
this preemption case was based on the lack of authority to create safety and 
effectiveness requirements, not whether the agency has wisely used that au-
thority or made correct decisions. Id. at 502. In Riegel, the Court found that 
the FDA did have such authority so preemption was appropriate under § 360k 
whether or not the court agreed with the FDA’s decision. Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). 
 235. Implementation problems are to be addressed by Congress, the agen-
cy, or the political process, not by state courts. See David M. Gossett, Chevron, 
Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 681 (1997). 
 236. The IOM is part of the National Academies of Science and is intended 
to provide “authoritative advice to decision makers.” About the IOM, INST. 
MED. NAT’L ACADS., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last updated Jan. 
18, 2012). The FDA asked the IOM to review the 510(k) clearance process for 
medical devices. See October Report, supra note 15, at 12. 
 237. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MEDICAL DEVICES AND PUBLIC’S 
HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (2011) [hereinaf-
ter IOM FINAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Medical-Devices-and-the-Publics-Health-
The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-Years.aspx. 
 238. One of the authors of this paper has written several articles asserting 
that the government is statutorily prohibited from relying on any report from 
the IOM 510(k) committee (regardless of its conclusions) because the IOM 
committee failed to have fair balance and representation from all stakeholders 
as required by § 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Ralph Hall & Eva 
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to its final report in July 2011, the IOM released several 
“Workshop Reports” detailing the FDA’s 510(k) clearance pro-
cess during the course of their study.239 The output of the IOM 
committee presents two, somewhat conflicting, pictures of the 
510(k) system. 
In the IOM’s October 2010 Report, the IOM stated that a 
safety and effectiveness determination is conducted prior to 
clearance of 510(k) medical devices. The IOM pointedly and 
correctly asserted that the same definitions of safe and effica-
cious apply to every medical device; the difference lies in how 
safety and effectiveness are determined for the specific de-
vice.240 The October Report sets forth how the FDA’s governing 
statutes establish safety and effectiveness, largely through the 
submission of data, special controls, and product classification 
systems.241 Conversely, in its final report, the IOM stated that 
“[t]he 510(k) clearance process is not intended to evaluate the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices with some excep-
tions.”242 IOM supports this conclusion, in part, by relying on 
Lohr—but without making the reassessment of that case as is 
done in this article.243 
More interestingly—and not apparent from the IOM head-
line—the IOM’s major criticism is not that the 510(k) system 
does not make a safety and effectiveness determination when 
reviewing a product, but rather the IOM is critical of the basis 
for the safety and effectiveness determination. Right after its 
conclusory statement referenced above, the IOM says “when 
the FDA finds a device substantially equivalent to a predicate 
device . . . it has done no more than find that the new device is 
                                                          
Svensvad, A Failure to Comply: An Initial Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medi-
cal Device Study Committee, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 731 (2011); Ralph 
Hall & Eva Svensvad, Left to Their Own Devices: IOM’s Medical Device Com-
mittee’s Failure to Comply, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 91 (2012); see also Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (2006). 
 239. See, e.g., October Report, supra note 15, at 2. 
 240. Id. at 8 (defining safety as the benefits of the medical device outweigh-
ing the risks and defining effectiveness as device producing significant results 
in a considerable portion of the intended population). 
 241. Id. at 11. 
 242. IOM FINAL REPORT, supra note 237, at 5. Even if one accepts the IOM 
conclusion without any analysis, that conclusion requires that preemption in 
510(k) cases exists in at least some cases. The IOM states that there are some 
cases in which the 510(k) system does conduct a safety and effectiveness de-
termination. 
 243. The IOM repeats this conclusion at various places throughout the re-
port using essentially the same reasoning and analysis. See, e.g., id. at 193. 
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as safe and effective as the predicate.”244 So as even the IOM 
agrees, the FDA makes a safety and effectiveness determina-
tion—it is just that the IOM disagrees with the criteria for that 
assessment.245 
Even taking the IOM’s statement as true (something which 
many contest), the IOM is simply disagreeing with the criteria 
or method used by the FDA to make a safety and effectiveness 
determination. The fact that, as even the IOM concedes, the 
FDA makes a safety and effectiveness determination and has 
the express authority to impose special controls or data re-
quirements is why § 360k is applicable to 510(k) products 
cleared under the current regulatory system. 
The IOM also acknowledges that the medical device system 
uses data to determine the proper classification of the device—
Class I, II, or III—that will ensure its safety and effective-
ness.246 The decision to place a device in a particular regulatory 
class is a finding that the device’s safety and effectiveness will 
be properly maintained under the regulatory controls the class 
imposes. Thus, the FDA has made a safety and effectiveness 
determination that the 510(k) system provides an adequate as-
surance of safety and effectiveness for that product if the device 
is determined to be substantially equivalent. This determina-
tion is made prior to the first market distribution of a product 
of that type. This process demonstrates the FDA’s focus on the 
safety and effectiveness of 510(k) devices.247 
The IOM may or may not be correct in its conclusion that 
the 510(k) system is insufficient and should be “junked,” and 
we note that the FDA immediately rejected the IOM’s call to 
                                                          
 244. Id. at 5–6. 
 245. As an aside, generic drugs generally are required to show that they 
are as safe and effective as the reference drug. This is the same philosophical 
approach to regulation of new products as that which the IOM criticized in its 
view of how the 510(k) uses predicates. As noted elsewhere, generic drug law-
suits are subject to preemption as set forth in cases such as Mensing. See Sec-
tion II.E. supra. 
 246. IOM FINAL REPORT, supra note 237, at 12–13. The accompanying sci-
entific data demonstrates the safety and effectiveness of the device, allowing 
the FDA to appropriately place the device under the regulatory controls that 
will further the safety and effectiveness of the device. 
 247. October Report, supra note 15, at 11–12 (finding, in addition, that any 
change in the device that may affect its safety and effectiveness requires the 
manufacturer to submit additional data and “obtain a new clearance from the 
FDA”). This allows the FDA to verify that 510K devices on the market remain 
safe and effective for public use. 
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“junk” the 510(k) system.248 That argument is for the agency 
and Congress. The fact that, as even the IOM agrees, the 
510(k) process determines that the device in question is “as safe 
as” the predicate, that the device in question raises no new 
questions of safety and effectiveness, and that the 510(k) sys-
tem provides a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness 
is a safety determination outside of the authority of a state 
court jury to overthrow. 
2. Industry Views 
While industry’s views on the 510(k) system must be as-
sessed with consideration of the source, industry knows the 
510(k) system inside and out. Industry universally supports the 
conclusion that the 510(k) system is intended by Congress and 
the FDA to provide a “reasonable assurance of safety and effec-
tiveness.”249 
Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed) is a 
prominent player in the medical device industry and is deeply 
involved in the 510(k) regulatory process.250 AdvaMed con-
cludes, “data on device safety and use” is always collected in 
510(k) submissions.251 Ultimately, AdvaMed believes that the 
510(k) process is “one of many regulatory controls FDA has in 
place to ensure the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, 
regardless of their path to market.”252 
The California Healthcare Institute (CHI)253 also affirms 
                                                          
 248. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA to Seek Public Comment on 
IOM Recommendations (July 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm265908.
htm. 
 249. October Report, supra note 15, at 9. 
 250. What We Do, ADVAMED, http://www.advamed.org/MemberPortal/ (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2012). AdvaMed is a trade association for medical device com-
panies. Id. 
 251. ADVAMED, THE 510(K) PROCESS: THE KEY TO EFFECTIVE DEVICE 
REGULATION 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.onlinetmd.com/FileUploads/file/AdvaMed_510K_White_Paper.pdf 
(emphasis added) (clarifying that “[t]his [data] provides FDA with information 
on actual, clinical use of well-characterized medical devices on which to base 
regulatory decisions”—the regulatory decisions that will continue to assure 
the determined safety and effectiveness of the device as demonstrated by the 
collected data). 
 252. Id. at 22 (emphasis added) (noting that “[i]t is important for patients 
to know that devices cleared via the 510(k) process undergo thorough FDA re-
view” allowing the FDA to make sure devices are safe and effective). 
 253. California Heath Institute is “[a] public policy research and advocacy 
organization for California’s biomedical industry.” California Healthcare Insti-
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the FDA’s assurance of safe and effective devices through the 
510(k) clearance process. In reaching this conclusion, the CHI 
relies heavily on the FDA’s increased requirements and em-
phasis on assuring safety to support the CHI’s belief that 
510(k) medical devices that are determined to be substantially 
equivalent are found safe and effective prior to market distri-
bution.254 As support, the CHI also cites empirical data demon-
strating the safety and effectiveness of cleared devices. In par-
ticular, the CHI notes that 510(k) devices, are subject to Class I 
recalls—recalls that present the most risk—at the same rate as 
PMA devices.255 AdvaMed and the CHI support the FDA’s con-
clusion that the 510(k) process is clearing devices that the FDA 
has found to be safe and effective to market. 
3. Other Critics and Voices 
 Without doubt, the 510(k) system has been subject to 
criticism from certain advocacy and medical groups. For exam-
ple, Public Citizen has been critical of the 510(k) system for not 
providing enough safety protection. In fact, Public Citizen sup-
ported the IOM’s call for a new system to replace the 510(k) 
system.256 The concerns raised by Public Citizen focus on the 
use of the “substantial equivalence” test for safety and effec-
tiveness, the perceived lack of human clinical studies prior to 
clearance of a number of 510(k)s, and the view that the system 
was not appropriately balancing safety with patient access to 
                                                          
tute: Organizational Profile, CHI, http://www.chi.org/industry/ 
IndustryDetails.aspx?ID=5273 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
 254. See CAL. HEALTHCARE INST., UPCOMING CHANGES TO THE 510K 
PROCESS: NEW APPROVAL PATHWAYS AND THE IMPACT ON MEDICAL DEVICE 
AND DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION (2010), available at 
http://www.chi.org/uploadedFiles/Industry_at_a_glance/CHI-510K-White-
Paper-FINAL.pdf. 
 255. Id. at 6. 
 256. See, e.g., Article in PLos Medicine on Breakdown of U.S. Device Review 
Process, PUB. CITIZEN (July 2012), http://www.citizen.org/hrg1912; Statement 
of Dr. Michael Carome, Deputy Dir., Pub. Citizen’s Health Research Group, 
Public Citizen Applauds IOM’s Findings and Recommendations on 510(K) 
Medical Device Clearance Process (July 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3393. It must be 
noted that a long time Public Citizen litigation attorney and head of that 
group for a number of years was a contributor to this article and also served 
on the IOM 510(k) committee. It appears that he continues to serve in an of 
counsel role with Public Citizen. See Michael Carome, M.D. Deputy Director, 
Health Research Group, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ 
Page.aspx?pid=5140 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
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new or improved products. 
Several medical journals and medical societies have also 
published articles or otherwise opined on the robustness of the 
510(k) system. Some of these are critical and make the same 
points expressed by Public Citizen. Some assert that the 510(k) 
system is allowing an excessive number of unsafe products onto 
the market. In addition to challenging the basic premises un-
derlying the 510(k) system, these articles also question the 
FDA’s implementation of the statutory authority provided by 
Congress. 
The medical community has differing view on this issue. 
Others in the medical community have expressed support for 
the 510(k) system based on the view that the 510(k) system 
provides the agency with the authority to balance safety con-
cerns with patient access to valuable new medical therapies.257 
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with these vari-
ous positions, many of their stated concerns relate to imple-
mentation differences not authority issues. 
F. RECENT 510(K) CLEARANCES DEMONSTRATE AN ASSESSMENT 
OF SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
One of the best tests for whether the 510(k) system in fact 
assesses safety and effectiveness is to look at how the system is 
actually implemented. To do so, one can review recent 510(k) 
clearances of actual medical devices. When one does so, one 
clearly sees that in actual 510(k) clearances the FDA repeated-
ly references its review of safety and effectiveness data and 
that cleared products meet the statutory requirement for a rea-
sonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. 
When a device manufacturer submits a 510(k) summary—
instead of making the 510(k) statement—for the 510(k) for 
their device, the summary must include a basis for the FDA to 
conclude substantial equivalence.258 As discussed in section III, 
D.1, the manufacturer must include a “brief discussion of the 
clinical tests submitted . . . [that] include[s] . . . a discussion of 
the safety and effectiveness data[.]”259 Recent devices deter-
                                                          
 257. See, for example, the position of the American Academy of Orthopae-
dic Surgeons questioning whether there is actually a systemic problem with 
the 510(k) system. William M. Mihalko et al., The 510(k) Process—It’s Not 
Broken, so Why “Fix” it?, AM. ACAD. ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow/oct10/cover2.asp. 
 258. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (2011). 
 259. Id. Further, for a device to gain clearance, the tests must demonstrate 
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mined substantially equivalent under 510(k), coupled with 
their 510(k) summary demonstrate that FDA does, in fact, 
make safety and effectiveness assessments in making 510(k) 
product clearance decisions. 
Via Biomedical, Inc.’s Stent Graft Balloon Catheter was 
determined substantially equivalent and cleared for market 
distribution in 2009.260 Included in the 510(k) summary was 
the following: 
The Stent Graft Balloon Catheter underwent mechanical, perfor-
mance, and biocompatibility testing to verify that the device functions 
in a safe and effective manner. The results of the tests provide reason-
able assurance that the device has been designed and tested to assure 
conformance to the requirements for its indications for use.261 
In accepting Via Biomedical’s 510(k) summary and clearing 
the catheter for market, FDA acknowledged and confirmed the 
devices substantial equivalence for the indications determined 
safe and effective in the proceeding summary.262 
Becton, Dickinson and Company’s (Becton) BD Flu+ Sy-
ringe was cleared for marketing on July 2, 2009. As part of the 
requisite basis the manufacturer must submit, Becton express-
ly indicated that “[d]esign [v]erification tests were performed 
based on the risk analysis performed, and the results of these 
tests demonstrate that the BD Flu + Syringe performed in an 
equivalent manner to the predicate device and is safe and effec-
tive when used as intended.”263 The FDA similarly cleared the 
BD Flu + Syringe for its intended use—the specific use for 
which Becton determined. In doing so, the FDA confirmed the 
finding of safety and effectiveness for the BD Flu + Syringe. 
Likewise, ArthoCare’s Bone Cement Opacifier was cleared 
under 510(k) after the FDA confirmed that “[t]he performance 
testing and device comparison demonstrated that the subject 
device [was] substantially equivalent to the predicate device, 
                                                          
that “the device is as safe, as effective, and performs as well as or better than 
the [predicate] device . . . .” Id. 
 260. 510K Summary from Via Biomedical, Inc. on the Stent Graft Balloon 
Catheter, ACCESSDATA (May 29, 2009), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
cdrh_docs/pdf9/K091624.pdf. 
 261. Id. (emphasis added). 
 262. See id. 
 263. 510K Summary of Safety and Effectiveness from Becton, Dickinson 
and Company on the BD Flu+ Syringe, ACCESSDATA (July 2, 2009), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf9/K091377.pdf. 
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and is safe and effective for its intended use.”264 
Other examples of 510(k) devices—Master Healthcare’s 
Easy Touch Insulin Syringe,265 ZOLL Circulation’s Central Ve-
nous Catheter and Thermal Regulating System266 and Med-
tronic’s Cardiopulmonary Centrifugal Blood Pump267—all in-
cluded performance data specifically relating to and 
determining the safety and effectiveness of the device as part of 
the “basis” for 510(k) clearance.  
Actual 510(k) clearances repeatedly reference safety and 
effectiveness determinations. The real life implementation of 
the 510(k) system confirms that Congress created and the FDA 
implemented a system that specifically includes safety and ef-
fectiveness determinations. 
G. WHAT DOES A SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS DETERMINATION 
MEAN FOR LOHR? 
The Supreme Court found that the product liability claims 
in Lohr were not preempted based on the Court’s conclusion 
that under the 1982 510(k) system the FDA never made and 
did not have the authority to make a safety and effectiveness 
determination for the Model 4011 lead. The Court also found 
that the 1982 501(k) system did not create any device specific 
safety and effectiveness requirements applicable to the Model 
4011 lead. The Court left open the question of preemption for 
PMA devices—a question the Court answered in the affirma-
tive a few years later in Riegel. The Court found preemption in 
Riegel because the FDA does make a safety and effectiveness 
finding for PMA products. 
When applying current preemption doctrine to the 510(k) 
system, one can see that all of the relevant substantive ele-
                                                          
 264. 510K Summary from ArthroCare on the Bone Cement Opacifier, 
ACCESSDATA (Dec. 27, 2004), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/ 
pdf4/K042947.pdf (emphasis added). The device was not found to be as safe as 
the predicate, but there was an independent assessment. Id. The device was 
both substantially equivalent to the predicate as well safe and effective. Id. 
 265. 510K Summary from Masters Healthcare on the Easy Touch Insulin 
Syringe, ACCESSDATA (May 14, 2009) http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
cdrh_docs/pdf9/K091474.pdf. 
 266. 510K Summary from ZOLL Circulation for Venous Catheter and 
Thermal Regulating System, ACCESSDATA (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K101987.pdf. 
 267. Summary of Safety and Effectiveness from Medtronic for the Cardio-
pulmonary Centrifugal Blood Pump, ACCESS DATA (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K100631.pdf. 
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ments of the PMA system found in Riegel to require preemption 
now exist in the 510(k) system. Specifically, one can ask wheth-
er the 510(k) system gives the FDA the authority to require da-
ta submission or the authority to impose safety requirements 
such as warnings or design requirements. The answer is yes. 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a), the FDA can implement special con-
trols applicable to all Class II devices of a certain type. These 
special controls can include—as the FDA deems appropriate—
clinical data submissions, post market registries, design re-
quirements, and labeling requirements. The FDA also has the 
authority to impose performance standards if such a standard 
“is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness of the device.”268 These various control mecha-
nisms are specific to the device type and are, by statutory defi-
nition,269 not the general controls at issue in Lohr. If necessary, 
the FDA can even use general controls to ban unsafe 510(k) de-
vices.270 
Of course, technology evolves and Congress has addressed 
that scenario as well. If the device has different technological 
characteristics compared to the predicate, the 510(k) sponsor 
must demonstrate that the device is still as safe and effective—
or they can be safer or more effective—as the predicate.271 Fur-
thermore, companies cannot make safety-related changes to a 
510(k) device without prior FDA clearance.272 
The bottom line is that one is hard pressed to identify a 
premarket or post-market requirement applicable to the device 
that the FDA could not have imposed, had the FDA chosen to 
do so. This includes clinical data requirements, design re-
quirements, and labeling requirements. While one might disa-
gree with what the FDA did or did not do, the fact remains that 
FDA had the authority to do so. If the authority exists, preemp-
tion applies. 
                                                          
 268. 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(1) (2006). The FDA can also require compliance 
with recognized national or international standards such as ISO standards. 21 
U.S.C. § 360d(c)(1)(A). 
 269. Special controls are separately defined by statute and are to be used 
when general controls (the regulatory mechanism at issue in Lohr) are not suf-
ficient to provide the reasonable assurance of safety required under the stat-
ute. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2006) (definition of general controls) and 21 
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (definition of special controls). 
 270. 21 U.S.C. § 360f (2006). 
 271. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii). 
 272. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2011). 
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As the above analysis demonstrates, the relevance of Lohr 
today is highly questionable in light of the current statutory 
framework and the FDA’s present implementation of the 510(k) 
system. Today, the FDA makes safety and effectiveness deter-
minations for 510(k) medical devices in determining the classi-
fication of the new device, compared to the predicate device, 
and whether the new device is substantially equivalent or not 
substantially equivalent. Due to this safety and effectiveness 
finding, and if the device is found to be substantially equiva-
lent, product liability claims asserted against 510(k) devices 
may well actually impose additional or conflicting requirements 
relating to the “safety and effectiveness of a medical device” 
cleared under 510(k).273 
There are two core reasons for preemption in “modern” 
510(k) cases. First, additional safety and effectiveness require-
ments are preempted under § 360k(a) of the FDCA, which dis-
allows state standards “relat[ing] to the safety and effective-
ness of the device.”274 Secondly, additional or different safety 
and effectiveness requirements at the state level hamper the 
central facet of the FDA mission: to balance safety, effective-
ness, and access to medical devices and to foster innovation. 
Because a state court or jury can only address—and may well 
be more concerned with—individual safety, they are not in a 
position to balance the negative impacts of the additional or dif-
ferent requirements on other patients, do not have access to all 
of the information available to the FDA, and are compelled to 
impose additional or different safety requirements for medical 
devices.275 
Riegel accurately describes the PMA process as a federal 
safety review, thereby pre-empting state claims relating to the 
                                                          
 273. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006). The “parallel claim” exception set forth 
in Riegel would appear to be applicable to the 510(k)-based product liability 
cases. 
 274. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2010) (stressing that state require-
ments relating to safety and effectiveness are pre-empted when the FDA “has 
established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific re-
quirements applicable to a particular device”). The assessment of safety and 
effectiveness in the 510(k) clearance process establishes a “specific counterpart 
regulation” for that medical device. 
 275. A state is more concerned with issues at the individual level, and 
therefore, places greater emphasis on the safety of the device. The FDA, on the 
other hand, must consider the entirety of the nation and must ensure safety, 
yet also promote medical device innovation as well. See Brief for Petitioner at 
16, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), 1996 
WL 88789. 
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safety or effectiveness of the medical device.276 The FDA now 
has the authority to impose safety requirements on 510(k) de-
vices, conduct a safety and effectiveness reviews for 510(k) de-
vices, and as such, state claims imposing additional safety 
standards should similarly be pre-empted. Arguably, if Med-
tronic’s Model 4011 Lead was cleared under today’s statutory 
regime, a Court assessing a product liability suit against that 
Lead should find the claim preempted. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we make two fundamental points relating to 
preemption and 510(k) products. First, Lohr analyzed the 
510(k) system as it existed thirty years ago. There have been 
material changes in the 510(k) system since that time. Statuto-
ry interpretation cases should not be blindly followed if there 
have been major changes in the statute since such decisions 
were issued. That is precisely the case with Lohr. Because the 
510(k) system has changed so much in the last thirty years, 
Lohr must be reassessed. Second, a reassessment of Lohr based 
on the current 510(k) system and current preemption law leads 
to the conclusion that a 510(k) product cleared under the mod-
ern system may well be entitled to preemption. 
The recent high level of attention on the 510(k) system has 
brought renewed focus to the system and demonstrated that, 
while perhaps not intuitive, the FDA has the authority to im-
pose safety and effectiveness requirements on 510(k) products 
and that the modern 510(k) system does, in fact, make safety 
and effectiveness determinations.277 The system does this 
through the initial classification process, the power to impose 
                                                          
 276. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312–13 (2008) (concluding that 
Mr. Riegel’s defective device claims were pre-empted by § 360k(a) because the 
State’s requirements held Medtronic’s balloon catheter to a different safety 
standard than the requirements placed by the FDA). 
 277. The recent FDA controversy involving the 510(k) clearance and then 
withdrawal of ReGen Menaflex has brought into the limelight the lack of 
knowledge by many about the current 510(k) system. In a preliminary report 
of the ReGen Menaflex review, the FDA avowed: “[o]ur review identified mul-
tiple sources of disagreement and confusion about 510(k) standards and prac-
tices[.]” FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REVIEW OF THE REGEN MENAFLEX: 
DEPARTURES FROM PROCESSES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES LEAVE THE 
BASIS FOR A REVIEW DECISION IN QUESTION 15 (2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/UCM183642.p
df. 
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requirements through mechanisms such as “special controls,” 
and then by the device-specific clearance decision—or non-
clearance decision— under the “substantially equivalent” test. 
While all agree that a 510(k) cleared device is “substantial-
ly equivalent” to a predicate, “substantial equivalence” is a 
term of art under the FDCA and implementing regulations. As 
such, it must be interpreted in light of how the statute defines 
and uses that term. Unlike prior “substantial equivalence” 
clearances, today’s substantial equivalence includes a finding 
that the device is both safe and effective for its intended use. 
Not only does Congressional purpose and statutory framework 
surrounding § 360c establish the requirement of the safety and 
effectiveness for 510(k) devices, but the FDA as well as other 
persuasive authorities demonstrate that a safety and effective-
ness determination is present in 510(k) decisions. This is shown 
through the express findings of safety and effectiveness docu-
mented in the device’s clearance letter. 
The standard applied in Lohr principally relied on the fact 
that the safety and effectiveness of the implanted lead were not 
accounted for prior to the device’s clearance. This finding is 
now outdated and no longer applicable. The Court’s finding in 
Riegel—in which product liability claims brought under state 
law are preempted due to FDA’s authority to impose safety re-
quirements and its prior determination of safety and effective-
ness for the PMA device—should apply to 510(k) devices as 
well. 
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Appendix 
 
Comparison of the 1976 statute with current statute. 
 
Current 1976 
Does Current 
System Impose 
More Safety or 
Effectiveness 
Requirements? 
Requires the foregoing infor-
mation to be available before a 
device can be classified as  
Class II: 
Promulgation of per-
formance standards; 
Postmarket surveil-
lance; Patient regis-
tries; Development and 
dissemination of guide-
lines (including guide-
lines for the submission 
of clinical data in pre-
market notification 
submissions in accord-
ance with 510(k)); and 
Recommendations, and 
other appropriate ac-
tions as the Section 
deems necessary to 
provide such assurance. 
If not available, classi-
fied in Class III 
 
360c(a)(
B) and 
(C)(i)(II) 
513(a)(B) 
Only re-
quired 
that 
there be 
“suffi-
cient in-
formation 
to estab-
lish a 
perfor-
mance 
stand-
ard” 
Yes
The Secretary shall consider 
whether the extent of data that 
otherwise would be required for 
approval of the application with 
respect to effectiveness can be 
reduced through reliance on 
postmarket controls. 
 
360c(a) 
(3)(C) 
Not in 
1976 
statute 
Indirectly 
The Secretary, upon written re-
quest, shall meet with a person 
intending to submit application 
under § 360e and determine the 
type of scientific evidence neces-
sary to demonstrate device’s ef-
fectiveness. 
 
360c(a) 
(3)(D)(i) 
Not in 
1976 
statute 
Indirectly  
Any clinical data, including one 
or more well-controlled investi-
gations, specified in writing by 
the Secretary for demonstrating 
a reasonable assurance of device 
360c(a) 
(3)(D)(ii) 
Not in 
1976 
statute 
Yes 
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effectiveness shall be specified 
as result of a determination by 
the Secretary that such data are 
necessary to establish device 
effectiveness. 
 
The Secretary may initiate the 
reclassification of a device clas-
sified into Class III, or the man-
ufacturer or importer of a device 
classified under paragraph (1) 
may petition the Secretary for 
the issuance of an order classify-
ing the device in Class I or  
Class II. 
 
360c(f) 
(3)(A) 
Not in 
1976 
statute 
Yes
Upon determining that a peti-
tion does not contain any defi-
ciency, the Secretary may refer 
the petition to an appropriate 
panel to make a recommenda-
tion to the Secretary respecting 
approval or denial of the peti-
tion. A recommendation shall 
contain: 
a summary of the rea-
sons for the recommen-
dation; 
a summary of the data 
upon which the recom-
mendation is based; 
and 
an identification of the 
risks to health (if any) 
presented by the device 
with respect to which 
the petition was filed. 
In the case of a petition for a 
device which is intended to be 
implanted in the human body or 
which is purported or represent-
ed to be for a use in supporting 
or sustaining human life, the 
panel shall recommend that the 
petition be denied unless the 
panel determines that the clas-
sification in Class III of the de-
vice is not necessary to provide 
reasonable assurance of its safe-
ty and effectiveness. 
 
360c(f) 
(3)(B)(i) 
Not in 
1976 
statute 
Yes
 
 
